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NOTES
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN MARINE LIABILITY INSURANCE*
IT has long been established in fire insurance law that the insurer is
responsible for all damage to the insured property caused by a fire starting
within the term of the policy, even though the greater part of the damage
occurs after the policy's expiration.' A similar rule has been applied in
marine,2 and workman's compensation insurance law ;3 but a recent decision
in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a case dealing with
a liability insurance contract,4 has cast doubt upon the breadth of application
of the fire rule.
Export, owner of the steamship Exinoor, was insured against losses arising
from liability for damage to cargo. In the middle of a voyage, the original
insurance policy was replaced by a substantially similar policy with a second
insurer. It was discovered on unloading that a cargo of tobacco, as a result
of negligent stowage, had suffered great damage by gradual deterioration over
the course of the voyage. When Export, having indemnified the shipper,
* Export Steamship Corp. v. American Insurance Co., 106 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939).
1. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. David Moffat Co., 154 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 2d,
1907); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Doll, 23 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928); Davis v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 158 Cal. 766, 112 Pac. 549 (1910) - see Saul v. Northwestern
Nat. Ins. Co., 79 Pa. Super. 322, 324 (1922) ; VANCE, LAW OF IN4sURAN CE (1930) 699.
The earliest case reference to the fire rule is in Insurance Co. v. Crunk, 91 Tenn. 376
(1892), which bases the rule on 2. MAY, LAW OF INSURANCE (3d ed. 1891) § 401. May,
then, cites 2 ALAUZET, DES ASSURANCES § 461. But in Rochester German Ins. Co. v.
Peaslee-Gaulbert, 120 Ky. 752, 87 S. W. 1115 (1905) the court appears to base its deci-
sion on the marine "death blow" cases cited in the briefs of counsel in that case and
cited infra note 2. (1905) 17 GREEN BAG 674.
2. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Powell, 52 Ky. 250 (1852) ; Coit & Woolsey v. Smith, 3
Johns. Cas. 16 (N. Y. 1802) (horses injured during insured voyage and died after term
of policy-full recovery); Duncan v. Great Western Ins. Co., 1 Abb. App. Dec. 562
(N. Y. 1867), affg, Crosby v. N. Y. Mutual Ins. Co., 5 Bos. 369 (N. Y. 1859); see
5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW (1929) § 1213.
Uncertainty in this field of insurance was caused by illcrelony v. Dunlope, allegedly
decided by Lord Mansfield, cited in Lockyer v. Offley, 1 T. R. 252 (K. B. 1786), which
was believed to hold that the insurer is liable for only those losses which are known
at the expiration of a policy. In Knight v. Faith, 15 Q. B. 649 (1850) it was doubted
that such a doctrine was ever laid down in Meretony v. Dunlopc, and the holding in
Lockyer v. Offley, supra, was capably distinguished. Howell v. Protection Ins, Co., 7
Ohio 284 (1835) is the only American case following that doctrine. One writer suggests
that that case may have been so decided because of the belief that the loss was increased
by a later intervening cause. 1 PHILLIs, Law OF INSURANCE (3d ed. 1853) 685.
3. Treadwell v. Columbia Casualty Co., 167 So. 103 (La. C. A. 2d, 1936) (conipli-
cations developing after term from injury to eye during policy's coverage); Phillips v.
Holmes Exp. Co., 190 App. Div. 336, 179 N. Y. Supp. 400 (3d Dep't 1919) (rebreaklng
of arm from old fracture).
4. Export S. S. Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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sought reimbursement under its policies, the court was called upon to deter-
mine which of the two insurers should bear the loss. The district court held
that the first insurer was liable for the full amount. On appeal, the circuit
court apportioned the loss on the basis of an estimate by one of the expert
witnesses as to the amount of damage taking place during the coverage of
each policy. Judge Clark, dissenting, approved the decision of the lower
court.
In refusing to extend the fire rule to the instant case the majority was
apparently partially motivated by a belief that the rule is a minority one
confined to the fire cases. This belief seems to stem from a misreading of
the cases in related fields of insurance law. The majority apparently deduced
that in marine and workman's compensation insurance, the insurer is liable
only for damage actually occurring during the term of the policy. It is true that
the rule in these groups of cases is stated in less precise language than that em-
ployed in the fire cases; but the holdings in all lead no less definitely to the
rule that "a damage begun is a damage done, where the culmination is the
natural and unbroken sequence of the beginning."' It seems, therefore, that
the fire cases, as judge Clark remarked, are not an exception to the rule-
they are simply the rule.
In its effort to demonstrate the peculiar and limited nature of a rule which
gives coverage for damage occurring beyond the agreed term of the policy,
the majority points out that in life insurance the insurer is not liable on a
policy which has expired before the actual death of the insured -however
imminent death may be at the time of expiration. This is certainly a correct
statement of the law ;7 but it has no relevance to the fire rule.8 In all insurance
cases the first inquiry is aimed at determining the event insured against-
the force which, under the contract, causes the risk to "fall in," and the
insurer to assume the responsibilities of the insured with respect to the sub-
ject of the policy.9 This force in life insurance cases is death; in fire cases,
fire: and as the imminence of death does not mature the policy, neither does
the imminence of fire, not yet in contact with the insured property, mature
a fire policy.10
5. Export S. S. Corp. v. American Ins: Co., 26 F. Supp. 79 (S. D. N. Y. 193S).
6. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 767, 87 S. IV.
1115, 1119 (1905). See cases cited notes 1 and 2, supra.
7. Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 3 Robt. 232 (N. Y. Vt5), rcv'd on ollicr
grounds, 44 X. Y. 276 (1871); 4 JoYcE. LAw or Iistn ucg (1918) § 2792; 2 MY,
LAW or INSLRLXucE (3d ed. 1891) § 401.
8. The court in Howell v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 3 Robt. 232 (N.Y. 1S55),
supra note 7, in refusing to follow cases cited by counsel, recognized that life insurance
and property insurance cases are not analogous. See 1 Pnu.Lips, Lw, or I:zsvnAcu
(3d ed. 1853) § 1148; 5 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF I.sunA.ce LAw (1929) § 1213.
9. See Physicians Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576, 579 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912);
British & Foreign Marine Ins. Co. v. Gaunt, 2 A. C. 41, 47 (1921).
10. Rochester German Ins. Co. v. Peaslee-Gaulbert Co., 120 Ky. 752, 7 S. W. 1115
(1905). But cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Heck, 65 Ill. 111 (1872) (cancellation of policy by
insurer, provided for in contract, not permitted when fire wvas imminent at time can-
cellation attempted).
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There is, then, a parallel between life and fire cases as to the inception of
liability; but there is none as to its extent. Life policies are primarily invest-
ment policies, with the amount of the insurance payment completely pre-
arranged." There can therefore be no question involved as to the degree
of damage at death of the insured. A fire policy on the other hand is a
policy of indemnity ;12 and after the attaching of the risk there remains the
further question of determining the degree of damage covered by the policy.
With the solution given by the fire cases to this second inquiry, the life cases
are in no way in conflict: they do not deal with the problem.
The instant case falls within the indemnity, not the investment category.13
But before applying to it the fire rule of damages, the initial' question as to
the time when the risk "falls in" must be answered. This inquiry is here
unusually difficult, because the event is not, as in the cases just discussed,
a physical one; it is the accruing of the insured's liability. The occurrence
of a physical event presents merely a fact question, determinable by objective
evidence; but "liability" is a complex legal concept,' 4 and to determine the
time of its accrual requires the application of legal rules. It is clear to begin
with that there is no liability, and hence no maturing of the policy, until the
first damage to the cargo. 15 The negligent quality of an act can be determined
only by reference to a particular consequence; there is no legal liability for
"abstract" negligence.10 From the non-legal standpoint the same conclusion
follows: the shipper will not call the carrier to account for negligent acts which
fail to cause loss. The parties cannot have intended a policy against "liability"
to mature before the first point at which loss to the shipper gave him both
the motive and the legal right to claim indemnification from the insured
carrier.
Conversely, it seems that the policy should mature at that point, and no
later. It is at the moment that a cause of action accrues against the insured,
that the risk has fallen in. But the connotations of the term "liability" lead to
further logical objections to this position. The first insurer suggested, for
example, that liability did not accrue until the time of discharge of the cargo
in unsatisfactory condition, because that was the time on which the claim by
the shipper against the carrier was based.' 7 The court quite justly threw out
11. VANCE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 26, 27, 47, 80. But see 1 MAY, op. Cit. supra note
1, §7.
12. Cross v. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 132 N. Y. 133, 30 N. E. 390 (1892); VAmNcE, id.
at 75 (true of all property insurance); cf. 1 ARNOULD, MARINE INSURANCE (12th ed.
1939) § 3 (marine insurance).
13. Joyce v. Kennard, L. R. 7 Q. B. 78 (1871) (similar policy).
14. See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied it Judicial Reason-
ing (1913) 23 YALE L. J. 16, (1916) 26 YALE L. J. 710.
15. Majority and dissent agreed as to this, both citing Corporation of the Royal Ex-
change Assurance Co. v. United States, 75 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
16. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928). But el.
Corbin, Rights and Duties (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 501, in which writer suggests that the
breach of a duty consists in conduct and not its consequences and suggests that penal-
ties be imposed for such breach. The article, however, is not built on case law, but is
an elaboration of the Hohfeldian system. See note 14, supra.
17. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, pp. 20-25, Export S. S. Corp. v. American Ins.
Co., 106 F. (2d) 9 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
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this suggestion as laying the basis for collusive actions; for, under this ra-
tionale, the shipper, according to his choice between a suit in contract or in
tort, could vary the time of liability so as to throw the loss at will on the first
or second insurer.18 The first insurer's claim is closely analogous to the
basing of liability on the time of suit, the entering of judgment, or payment;
the form of a suit, based on a single set of operative facts, is, like all these
named events, concerned with the process of proof and extinguishment of
liability, not with its inception.
A further doubt as to the justification of placing the inception of liability
at the first moment of damage was raised by judge Swan on the argument
on appeal.' 9 The judge raised the question whether there would be any"
liability based on the negligent stowage, if, before unloading, the ship should
be completely lost from a cause excepted in the bill of lading. The inference
apparently is that such a catastrophe would eliminate all previous liability
so that it cannot be said that liability accrues until, on unloading, it is certain




This, again, would seem to be without effect on the time of inception of
liability: it is a problem of proximate cause. It might well be said that the
intervening cause would be the cause only of the loss of the undamaged part
of the cargo. But even were it assumed that this would wipe out previous
liability, the reason it would do so is that the negligent stowage is no longer
the cause of the loss.2 1 This conclusion, even if adopted, does not make
inapplicable the fire rule which holds the insurer liable from the attachment
of the policy for all damage proximately resulting from the original force.-
The later damage need not be absolutely inevitable; the problem is one of
fact-to determine, whether, looking back at all the circumstances, the
damage was the direct result of the cause in question.2
It now becomes apparent that the majority in apportioning the damage
between the two insurers was acting under a misunderstanding of the applica-
ble rules of law. Starting from a misreading of the damages rule in the marine
insurance cases and further confused by a wrong analogy to life insurance,
the court reached the conclusion that the fire rule was a mere exception. From
this premise it was easy to be misled into confusing the two inquiries essential
18. See Lattin v. Gillette, 95 Cal. 317, 319, 30 Pac. 545, 546 (1892). Under modern
code pleading the operative facts, and not the form of the pleadings, should fully deter-
mine the rights of all parties involved. See CLARK, CoDE P.x-,toix (192S) §§ 46, 114, 116.
19. Pri-vate communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL. Oct. 6, 1939.
20. By analogy, perhaps, to the old marine rule that the breach of a varranty in a
policy of insurance voids the contract ab initio. See Hibbert v. Pigou, 3 Doug. 224 (K. B.
1783) ; MARsHaALL, LAw oF IxsuRANcE (1805) 250. But this rule does not apply tcday
to losses occurring previous to the breach. 2 ARN.OrLD, MARINE IxSurANCE (12th cd.
1939) § 634.
21. Cf. Matter of -Anderson v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 256 N. Y. 146, 149, 175 X. E.
654, 655 (1931) (where there were successive workman's compensation liability plides
and second injury grew out of first With intervention of new cause, each insurer va!,
liable for extent of injury attributed to cause effective during his term).
22. See VANcE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 699.
23. Schnell v. The Vallescura, 293 U. S. 296, 55 Sup. Ct. 194 (1934) scm!i,; Laoa.a
Fruit Steamship & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U. S. 556 (1938).
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to the case - falling in of the risk and the measure of damages - and to infer
from the increasing physical damage that liability accrued gradually from the
moment of first damage. It is at that moment, however, that the risk insured
against matures, and it seems a confusing use of terminology to speak of the
liability as increasing thereafter. The liability remains the same - only the
amount of damage increases. 24 In this view liability is as truly a single event
as a fire, and when it occurs the insurer assumes the responsibility of the
insured. The form in which those responsibilities are discharged and the sub-
sequent increase in their amount should make no difference to the time of
falling in of the risk.
25
When, therefore, a distinction is drawn, as in the fire cases, between the
falling in of the risk and the later measure of damage, and the confusion
created by the fact that the event in this case is "liability" is cleared away,
it seems in accord with the intent of the parties that the first moment of
liability causes the risk to fall in and makes the insurer liable, under the fire
cases, for all later proximate damage. This is the only rule which truly relates
the insurer's liability to the falling in of the risk insured against.20 Further,
despite the apparent practicality of apportioning the loss according to the
amount of damage occurring within the coverage of the respective policies2 T
it is the only practical rule. Insurance companies, operating on the basis of
actuarial calculations, require above all a rule which is certain in its appli-
cation.28 But certainty cannot be attained by apportionment, based on the
24. Judge Clark clearly points out that the only breach of duty by the carrier took
place on stowage, that shipping practice does not permit continual reloading in search
of defects of stowage. Export S. S. Corp. v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9, 13 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1939). See BRIIGER & VATr"S, TnE STOWAGE OF CARGO (1927) 17-18.
25. Some policies are drawn to require the insured to take certain procedural steps,
such as compel payment to the shipper as a condition precedent to collection from the
insurer. Such requirements, however, do not affect the time of the accrual of the in-
surer's liability. Slavens v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 27 F. (2d) 859 (C. C. A. 9th,
1928) ; Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 100
F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); Ross v. American Express Employers' Liability Ins.
Co., 56 N. J. Eq. 41, 38 Atl. 22 (1897).
26. This is clarified by the consideration of the cases where there is only one insurer.
If the "risk fall' in" during the term of the policy, all subsequent damage is covered.
See note 1, supra. If the "risk falls in" before the issuance of the policy, damage taking
place during its term is not covered. See Saul v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 79 Pa.
Super. 322, 324 (1922).
27. Quite possibly the court was misled by the fairness and practicality of the
divided damages rule in marine collision cases as compared with the common law con-
tributory negligence rule. See The Catharine, 17 How. 170 (U. S. 1854); RonmsoN,
ADMImALTY LAW (1939) 856. It is apparent, however, that the basis of the divided dam-
ages rule is not applicable here. In the collision cases the damage to each vessel is easily
determinable, and the rule is an equitable and practical division of the loss between co-
tortfeasors. In circumstances similar to those in the instant case, apportionment is ex-
tremely uncertain, and is at variance with the legal principles governing insurance con-
tracts.
28. See Howell v. Protection Insurance Co., 7 Ohio 284, 287 (1835); Lockyer v.
Offley, 99 Eng. Rep. 1079, 1083 (K. B. 1786) ("it is of more consequence that the rule
be certain than whether it is established one way or the other"), both supra note 2. The
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guesses of experts.29 It would have been but a logical extension of settled
doctrine to apply the fire rule in the present case. This extension the majority,
through its misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the rule, and its
failure to disperse the fog surrounding the slippery term "liability," regrettably
failed to make. It is therefore unfortunate that a decision .hich can only have
the effect of confusing the legal principles involved, should at the same time
set up a rule so clearly impractical. 0°
SET-OFF OF CONTINGENT CLAIM IN BANKRUPTCY*
ONE consequence of the unusual contractual relationship existing betwveen
an insurance company and its so-called "loan correspondent"' is the unique
problem of set-off sometimes presented upon the bankruptcy of the latter.
In a recent case, under long-standing agreement between the parties,2 Chick-
need for certainty still obtains, but it is now apparent that it cannot be provided by a
rule involving apportionment.
29. In the instant case, the apportionment was based on an estimate of a single %,it-
ness. The other witnesses with one exception disagreed with the figure supporting it and
refused to make an estimate because of the uncertainty involved. Enport S. S. Corp.
v. American Ins. Co., 106 F. (2d) 9, 13 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). See The Georgian, 76 F.
(2d) 550, 551 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) (recognition of necessarily haphazard nature of
apportionment of marine damage).
30. See note 27, supra. Of course, the unfortunate effect of the decision could Ue
avoided, by contract, through the insertion of a "continuation" clause. 1 Ani:oLD, MtA-
RmE IsURA=cE (12th ed. 1939) § 440. It would almost seem that the moral to be drawn
from this case is contained in the adage "Never change horses in midstream."
*Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F. (2d) 441 (C. C. A. Gth,
1939), cert. denied, U. S. Sup. Ct. No. 261, Oct. 9, 1939.
1. Customarily, the "loan correspondent" is given the exclusive right to submit
to the insurance company applications for loans upon the security of real estate in a
specified area. The loans usually take one of two forms. In one type of tranmacti,n,
the loan is arranged by the loan correspondent without having previously procured the
insurance company's approval of the application, but with a vie\v to selling the loan to
the insurance company. In such a case, the papers are drawn upon the forms of the
loan correspondent and the loans are made payable to it to be endorsed over to the
insurance company should it purchase the loans. In the second type of transaction, the
loan correspondent submits to the insurance company applications for loans drawn on
the forms of the insurance company. If the loans are approved, the loan correspondent
then draws and procures the execution of all loan papers, has titles e.amined and
mortgages recorded in the name of the insurance company, and closes the loans by advanc-
ing its own money to the borrowers. The loan papers are then forwarded to the insurance
company for final approval. The instant case arose out of a transaction of the second
type.
For other legal problems arising out of the "loan correspondent" arrangement, see
former case between the same parties, Prudential Insurance Co. of America ,. Nelson,
96 F. (2d) 487 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938). For a complete description of this relationship,
see Record on Appeal, p. 9 et seq.
2. Record on Appeal, p. 15 et seq., where the agreement is set out in full.
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amauga Trust Company, after receiving from the Prudential Insurance Com-
pany of America preliminary approval of several applications for loans which
the Trust Company had submitted, disbursed its own funds to close the loans
with the borrowers.3  Chickamauga went bankrupt before sending to the
Insurance Company the loan papers, which were all drawn in favor of
Prudential.4 According to the contract with Chickamauga, Prudential was
to be "the sole judge . . . as to the legal sufficiency of the title to the security,"
before reimbursing Chickamauga. The trustee in the Chickamauga bankruptcy
forwarded the papers to Prudential, which, upon examination, promptly found
the title sufficient and closed the loans.5
Prudential then claimed the right to set off the $11,613.70 which it owed
the bankrupt because of these loans against the indebtedness of $115,000
owed to it by the bankrupt.; The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, affirming the judgment of the district court, 7 decided that set-off,
as provided by Section 68a of the Bankruptcy Act,8 would not be allowed
in this case, because the Insurance Company had "an option to accept or
decline" the notes subsequently tendered it by the trustees, and therefore
the debt due the trustee did not accrue until after bankruptcy.9
In view of the growing tendency of the courts not to give full effect to
a clause in a contract making the purchaser's promise conditional upon his
personal satisfaction,' ° it would seem that if the question of bankruptcy had
3. According to the agreement, upon Prudential's final approval of loans, Chick-
amauga became entitled to interest from the date of disbursement to the borrowers to
the date of payment by Prudential. Record on Appeal, p. 10.
4. In each case the papers consisted of notes and a recorded mortgage or deed of
trust. Record on Appeal, Exhibits 8-16.
5. Pursuant to an agreed order entered in the bankruptcy court, the loans were
closed without prejudice to the rights of either party as to set-off. Record on Appeal,
pp. 13, 14.
6. This sum represented collections made by Chickamauga for Prudential from
various borrowers.
7. The memorandum opinion of the district court is set forth in the Record on
Appeal at p. 75 et seq.
8. "In all cases of mutual debts or mutual credits between the estate of a bankrupt
and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall be set-off against the other,
and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." 52 STAT. 878, 11 U. S. C. § 108a (Supp.
1938).
9. In the course of its decision, the court stated the problem as follows: "If the
Insurance Company's debt to the trustee did not accrue until after bankruptcy, then
equity does not permit the set-off because as the debt of the Insurance Company did
not exist when the estate of the bankrupt passed into the hands of the trustee, the equities
of the bankrupt's other creditors intervene to prevent the depletion of the assets in the
hands of the trustee by extinguishing a good debt due the estate by a bad one due a
creditor from the estate." Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Nelson, 101 F. (2d)
441, 443 (C. C.A. 6th, 1939).
10. Jackson Lumber & Supply Co. v. Deaton, 209 Ky. 239, 272 S. W. 717 (1925);
MacDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 156 N. E. 740 (1927); Dillinger v. Ogden,
244 Pa. 20, 90 Atl. 446 (1914) ; Robeson & Weaver v. Ramsey, 147 Tenn. 25, 245 S. W.
413 (1922) ; see Duffy Bros. v. Bing & Bing, 217 App. Div. 10, 15, 215 N. Y. Supp. 755,
760 (1st Dep't 1926). Contra: Hollingsworth v. Colthurst, 78 Kan. 455, 96 Pac. 851
(1908) and cases cited therein. Cf. RESTATEMENT, CONRACrs (1932) § 265.
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not affected the present case, a court would not have held, despite the "sole
judge" provision in question, that the Insurance Company had the absolute
and unqualified right to reject the loans, aff r its preliminary approval of the
applications and the disbursement to the borrowers by Chickamauga. " The
better view of the transaction seems to be that the Insurance Company was
under an obligation to reimburse Chickamauga, unless in fact the title to
the security was not legally sufficient.1 2 Under this interpretation, it would
follow that the Insurance Company was under a definite obligation as soon
as Chickamauga dosed the loans with the borrowers, although whether this
obligation remained binding could not be determined until examination of
the papers, which in this case did not take place until after bankruptcy.
Although the court is obviously correct in its contention that the rights
of the parties are adjusted as of the date of bankruptcy, 3 the fact that the
amount which Prudential owed Chickamauga was unascertained at that time
would not, of course, defeat the right of set-off.14 The rule against allowing
a preference in the settlement of a bankrupt's estate precludes the allowance
of a set-off when a creditor, after the filing of the petition, purchases property
belonging to the estate' or in some other way becomes its debtor.10 But
11. See cases cited supra note 10. Dillinger Y. Ogden, 244 Pa. 20, 90 Adt. 446 (1914),
is clearly analagous to the instant case. According to the contract in that case, the
defendants were to be bound "only on condition it [the title] should prove to be satis-
factory to them. . . ." The court said: ". . . The vendees were not at liberty to
refuse arbitrarily to accept. They could nkt reject the title capriciously. If it was good,
the- were bound to take it." 244 Pa. at 25, 90 At. at 448. Of course this rule would
not apply to contracts involving the satisfaction of personal taste or whim. Schuyler v.
Pantages, 54 Cal. App. 83, 201 Pac. 137 (1921) ; Schwartz v. Cohn, 1279 N. Y. Supp. 464
(Sup. Ct. 1911).
12. But according to the court's reasoning, "It is a fair presumption from the rezord
in this case that the purpose of the Insurance Company in accepting the notes tendered
it by the trustee conditioned on it remitting cash was to use their purchase price as an
offset." (p. 444). Prudential's contention, however, is that the notes in question are its
property, as discussed infra. The court's presumption, which makes it hostile to the
allowance of a set-off here, is that Prudential was eager to recoup some of its loss by
exercising the right of set-off, but the same may be said of any creditor taking advantage
of the provisions of § 68a. There is nothing in the record to show any defect in the
title to the security of these loans. In fact, with each set of loan papers, the trustee
in bankruptcy sent to the insurance company a title guaranty policy or certificate of title
by an attorney. Record on Appeal, Exhibits 8-16.
13. "After the bankruptcy proceeding has commenced, the estate and its repreTenta-
tives . . . are in custodia legis for the purpose of preserving the estate on behalf of
the creditors. Hence, debts accruing to the trustees are given a status different from
those to the bankrupt and cannot be set-off against debts of the bankrupt." In re Schulte
Retail Stores, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 94735 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); In re Montgomery
Bros., 51 F. (2d) 284 (S. D. 'Miss. 1931) ; Chiple, State Bank v. McNeill, 77 na. 27,
82 So. 292 (1919).
14. See note 19, infra.
15. Bramham v. Lanier Bros., 138 Tenn. 702, 200 S. W. 830 (1913). Accord:
Otis -t Shants, 128 N. Y. 45, 27 N. E. 955 (1891) (action on a note for gotds sold in
liquidation proceedings). See Note (1931) 71 A. L. R. 304.
16. Deposits made by the trustee in bankruptcy cannot be set off against debts of
the bankrupt. Gardner v. Chicago Title Co., 261 U. S. 453 (1923) ; In re Montgomery
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the bankruptcy courts do not deny the right of set-off in cases of claims which
are owing though not due' 7 at the time of the filing of the petition ;18 and
when there is a definite liability at that time, it is held to be no bar to the
right of set-off that the claim is as yet unliquidated. 19 Even the right to
set off contingent liabilities has been recognized in cases where there was
a definite obligation at the time of the filing of the petition.20 Thus the con-
tingent liability of a creditor who had endorsed a note payable to the bankrupt
but not yet due at the date of the petition may be used to set off a claim by
the bankrupt's estate against him, if the maker defaults.
2 1
If it is agreed that Prudential had a positive though undetermined obliga-
tion to Chickamauga at the time of the filing of the petition, then the only
important remaining inquiry in a case of this kind should be the factual
Bros., 51 F. (2d) 284 (S. D. Miss. 1931) ; Hood v. Brownlee, 62 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A.
4th, 1933).
17. N. Y. County Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Xolkman v. Mfrs. Trust
Co., 27 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) ; In re Sparks Co., 46 F. (2d) 497, (W. D. S. C.
1929) ; Doggett v. Chelsea Trust Co., 73 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934). In Iolkman
v. Mfrs. Trust Co., supra, at 662, it was said: ". . . The privilege of set-off 1s not
confined to debts which were due, provided they are provable." Since under § 63a, debts
of the bankrupt include "A fixed liability . . . absolutely owing at the time of the
filing of the petition . . . whether then payable or not . . .," immature claims against
the bankrupt may be set off, and do not come within the prohibition of § 68b disallowing
counterclaims "not provable against the estate." In order for.set-off to be allowed, the
claim in the hands of the trustee need not be one of the type provable in bankruptcy in
case the one liable thereon had been adjudicated a bankrupt. See In re Harper, 175 Fed.
412, 422 (N. D. N. Y. 1910). But cf. 6 WILLiSTOT, CoNTRAcrs (rev. ed. 1938) § 1998;
4 REMINGTONr, BANKRUPTCY (1935 ed.) § 1459. However, the test of the provability of
a claim in bankruptcy is applied as an analogy to determine whether there is a debt due
to the trustee at the time of the filing of the petition. See infra note 18.
18. Formerly the courts recognized one exception to this well-established rule,
and, largely for historical reasons, denied the right to set off a liability for unaccrued
rent. Wasson v. White, 12 F. (2d) 809 (N. D. Oki. 1925); Standard Oil Co. of N. J.
v. Elliott, 80 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935). These cases are a result of the decisions
declaring that unaccrued rent is not a provable claim in bankruptcy, on the theory that
no debt is created until the time for payment has arrived. In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed,
667 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910).
19. Clifford v. Oak Valley Mills Co., 229 Fed. 851 (D. Mass. 1916). In this case,
the creditor, according to the agreement, had been paying only eight per cent of the
manufacturing charge, twenty per cent being reserved by defendant against counter-
charges for imperfect work. The court held that the defendant was entitled to apply
on its note such sums as might become due the bankrupt out of the reserve amounts,
although the sum was not ascertained at the date of bankruptcy.
20. In re Farnsworth, 8 Fed. Cas. No. 4, 673 (N. D. Il1. 1873) ; Morgan v. Wordell,
178 Mass. 350, 59 N. E. 1037 (1901).
21. In Maynard v. Elliott, 283 U. S. 273 (1931) the court held that the bankrupt's
liability as an endorser of negotiable paper was a provable claim in bankruptcy, despite
its contingency, because of its certainty of accrual and susceptibility of liquidation. Since
the analogy of whether a claim is provable in bankruptcy is used to decide whether
there is a debt to be offset at the time of the filing of the petition, Maynard v Elliott,
supra, is determinative of the right to set off in claims by the bankrupt against creditors
who are endorsers or sureties to him.
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question of whether or not a preference has been created. In litigation con-
cerning the right of set-off in bankruptcy, the controversy may center either
on the availability of the claim sought to be established against the bankrupt
or on the propriety of the claim said to be owing to the bankrupt. In the
case in which a debtor of the bankrupt seeks to escape payment of his obli-
gation by acquiring at a discount worthless claims against the in.solvent's
estate, the provisions of Section 6qb 22 prevent the depletion of assets in the
hands of the trustee. The right of the trustee to set aside voidable prefcr-'
ences 23 is ample protection24 against the converse situation, in which a
creditor of the future bankrupt. with his co-operation, designedly acquires
valuable goods or property from the insolvent, but does not pay fior them, - 1
or borrows money or receives a deposit2 '3 from the insolvent, in order to
claim the right, when sued after bankruptcy, to set off the amount owed to
him by the bankrupt.
Clearly, if there is a bona fide sale or transfer of property, made in the
usual course of business 27 and not done with intent to effect a preference,
the purchaser or bank should be allowed to set off the amount which he
owes by virtue of the transaction against the amount owed to him by the
22. "A set-off or counterclaim shall not be allowed in favor o'f any debtor o f thQ
bankrupt which (1) is not provable against the estate and allowable under subdivisikm
g of section 57 of this Act; or (2) was purchased by or transferred to him after tsie
filing of the petition or within four months before such filing, with a xiew to such we
and with knowledge or notice that such bankrupt was insolvent or had cimmitted an act
of bankruptcy." 52 STAT. 878, 11 U. S. C. § 108b (Supp. 1938). CcNle v. MurriTale
Coal Co., 289 Fed. 429 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
23. 52 STAT. 869, 870, 11 U. S. C. § 96 (Supp. 1938).
24. There was a movement, however, culminating in the intr,Aucti(n o f H11(ol
REsoLUTIox 12,889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), to add a third subhectin to (, C,-
taining an express prohibition against the preferential acquisition of a t-tdff 1.v me s
of a loan from the debtor to the creditor under such circumstances that the paymnrat ,f
the creditor's debt would constitute a voidable preference. In his article, . lspT' of 1:'?
Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act (1937) 4 U. oF CU. L. Rv.. 369, 398,
et seq., McLaughlin admits that the Act has adequate provigions to cover such a con-
tingency, but he would add a new section because lie feels that the courts are n-t "cuffi-
ciently alert to observe how bank deposits have frequently partaken of tl~e nature o-4
such preferential transfers."
25. In re White, 177 Fed. 194 (C. C. A. 7th, 1910): Hackney v. Ramond Bro-.
Clarke Co., 68 Neb. 633, 99 N. W. 675 (1904). In the latter case recovery w.as allowcd
against a creditor in the amount which he received on a sale of acco:unts against tlie
insolvent by a person whom he knew intended to use them as a set-off for purchaEs
from the insolvent.
26. 'Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Ernst, 231 U. S. 60 (1913): Elliotte v. Amerian
Sa,. Bank & Trust Co., 18 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) ; Kollman v. 'Mfrs. Trut
Co., 27 F. (2d) 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923) ; In re Putterman, 46 F. (2d) 175 (S. D. N. Y.
1930); Bank of Commerce & Trusts v. Hatcher, 50 F. (2d) 719 (C C. A. 4th, 1931).
27. See Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F. (2d) 522, at 529, 530 (C. C. ,.
4th, 1930), for an excellent summary of various cases in which the deposits were not
made in the usual course of business and consequently were held to be preferential pay-
ments to the bank.
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bankrupt.28 The fact that the deposit or sale is made within four months
of the filing of the petition will not defeat the right of set-off,2D since the law
provides for the operation of set-off in "all cases of mutual debts and credits"
and since it is highly desirable for the incipient bankrupt to be able to transact
business in a normal way up to the date of the filing of the petition.30
Deposits made even after the bank's officials knew of the depositor's finan-
cial difficulties have been held not to be transfers of property creating a
preference, provided the deposit is made in the usual course of business to
the open or general account of the depositor subject to check.3' In the absence
of a finding of fraud or collusion between the bankrupt and the bank, it is
said that the deposit does not operate to diminish the estate of the depositor,
because it creates at the same time an obligation on the part of the bank
to pay the amount of the deposit as soon as the depositor sees fit to draw
a check against it.
3 2
In the instant case, when Chickamauga paid the borrowers, the notes were
made over to Prudential and the mortgages were recorded in its name.
33
There was no preference, because the transaction was one of a long series
of similar transactions made in the usual course of business,3 4 and there was
no diminution of the assets of the insolvent, because in place of the money
Chickamauga had Prudential's obligation either to reimburse by payment in
cash or to assign the papers to Chickamauga so that it could collect the loans
from the borrowers.
3 5
Even if one accepts the court's position that Prudential was free to reject
the notes with impunity, the fact that Prudential exercised an option after
bankruptcy should not defeat the right of set-off, since there was a subsisting
28. N. Y. County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Continental Trust Co.
v. Chicago Title Co., 229 U. S. 435 (1913) ; Kane v. First Nat. Bank, 56 F. (2d) 534
(C. C. A. 5th, 1932).
29. See cases cited infra note 31.
30. In Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 229 U. S. 523, 529 (1913), it was said:
. . To deny the right of set-off, in cases like this, would in many cases make banks
hesitate to honor checks given to third persons, would precipitate bankruptcy and so
interfere with the course of business as to produce evils of serious and far-reaching
consequence." Also, see statement of Livingston, Hearing before House Judiciary Comn-
mittee on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 152 et seq. But cf. McLaughlin, loc. elt.
supra note 24.
31. N. Y. County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138 (1904) ; Continental Trust
Co. v. Chicago Title Co., 229 U. S. 435 (1913); Citizens' Nat. Bank of Gastonia v.
Lineberger, 45 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
32. N. Y. County Nat. Bank v. Massey, 192 U. S. 138, 147 (1904), declaring a
deposit is not a transfer within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act as a "payment, pledge,
mortgage, gift or security."
33. See note 4, supra.
34. There is no contention at all in the case that the transfer to the borrowers by
Chickamauga on behalf of Prudential was done under any suspicious circumstances or
with intent to prefer.
35. Following the analogy of the bank cases discussed above, a corresponding credit
was created against Prudential when Chickamauga paid the notes. Consequently the
transaction was not one which would fall within the prohibition of § 60.
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obligation on its part before bankruptcy by virtue of the fact that the notes
in question were made its property. 0 Although there is little authority in
point, it seems consistent with the general rule, that the rights of creditors
are fixed as of the date of bankruptcy, to hold that a contractual obligation
incurred before the filing of the petition to pay money or to transfer a
valuable property interest to a bankrupt may be used by wavy of set-off, m
even though the creditor has the right, after bankruptcy, to determine the
character of the obligation.38 The transaction under consideration in the
principal case is analagous to the case of merchandise purchased on "sale
or return." 39 If such a sale had been made in the usual course of business
by a seller who subsequently became bankrupt, it would seem contrary to
the general principles of set-off to deny the buyer the right to set off his
liability for the purchase price of the goods, on the ground that the time he
was to be allowed for the return of the goods did nut elapse until after bank-
ruptcy.40 In both the instant case and in the case of a "sale or return,"
36. Half Moon Fruit & Produce Co. v. Floyd, 60 F. (2d) 799 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932f.
See also Goodrich v. Dobson, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 13,297 (D. Conn. 1876), in which a
consignor sold goods after bankruptcy, but was allowed a set-off because of his sub-
sisting obligation before the petition to convert the goods into money for the account
of the bankrupt. In the instant case, before bankruptcy, Prudential had an obligation
either to reimburse Chickamauga or to endorse the notes over to Chickamauga. Of
course, if Prudential had not been given title until after bankruptcy, then clearly a set-off
would have violated the rule against allowing a preference in the settlement of a banl:-
rupt's estate.
37. 'A surety's alternative duty to return the property of a bankrupt road contractor
or to account for its value was held the proper subject of set-off. Hartford Ace. :
Ind. Co. v. Coggin, 78 F. (2d) 471 (C. C A. 4th, 1935).
38. Ibid. In Kane v. First Nat. Bank of El Paso, 56 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932), a bank had accepted checks for collection before it knew that the depositor was
insolvent, and upon learning this fact, claimed and was allowed the right of set-off against
the uncollected drafts. In an early case, In re Farnsworth, 3 Fed. Cas. No. 4, 673
(N. D. II. 1873), set-off was allowed even though the drafts were not collected until
after the filing of the petition. The best rationalization of these cases and those citcd
supra note 36 would seem to be that in all these instances, as in the principal case, legal
title to some property or other was given to the creditor under such circumstances that
the transaction was not a preference, because of the corresponding obligation created
on the part of the creditor. In all those cases, as in the principal case, the ercditor could
have returned property instead of money to the debtor, but the existence of such an
option does not mean that an enforceable liability is lacking at the time of banauptcy.
39. In "sale or return" as distinguished from "delivery on approval,' the owner-
ship rests in the buyer. The title passes subject to a condition subsequent, alloving
the buyer to revest title in the seller by returning the goods and thus to relieve himself
of liability for the purchase price. Vold, "Sale or Return" and "Dclk'cry on .4proval"
(1928) 2 DAY L. REv. 280.
40. The purchaser would consider himself the owner of the property. He would
bear the risks incident to ownership. Vdld, loc. cit. supra note 39. According to business
dealings, he would expect to be able to extinguish the seller's claim against him with
his credit against the seller. Other creditors cannot expect to reach those assets which
have been legally transferred during a mutual course of dealing. As was said, in Scott
v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 510 (1892), in answer to the argument that to allow a
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commercial expectancies would justify the set-off, and the person who had
had mutual dealings over a period of time with the insolvent would be given
the opportunity to salvage a portion of his loss.
LIFE INSURANCE GIFTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX*
TEE transfer inter vivos of life insurance policies has been a favorite pastime
of ingenious taxpayers, for the belief has prevailed that when an insured ir-
revocably assigns all the incidents of ownership' in such policies, the proceeds
at death will not be included in his taxable estate.2 By this device alert tax-
payers hope to save not only the substantial difference between the gift tax
and estate tax,3 but also the tax upon the difference between the proceeds of
the policy taxable at death and the "reproduction" value placed upon the
policy for purposes of the gift levy.4 Recently the complacency of such tax-
payers was disturbed for the first time by the decision of the Court of Claims
in Bailey v. United States5 which held that the proceeds of policies so assigned
set-off would constitute a preference: ". . . It is clear that it is only the balance,
if any, after the set-off is deducted which can justly be held to form part of the assets
of the insolvent." The idea which, it would seem, should prevail in this type of situation
is that ". . . one ought not to be required to pay a debt to his creditor if he cannot
ultimately compel the creditor to pay a debt due him." George D. Harter Bank v. Inglis,
6 F. (2d) 841, 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
*Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
1. Legal incidents of ownership in a policy include: The right of the insured or
his estate to its economic benefits, the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or
cancel the policy, to assign it, to revoke an assignment, to pledge it for a loan, or to
obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy. U. S. TREAS.
REG. 80, Art. 25.
2. An assignment is not necessary. The result is the same if a policy is taken out
irrevocably in the first instance in the name of a beneficiary and the insured reserves no
incidents of ownership.
3. For a discussion of the tax savings to be effected by use of the gift device, see
MONTGOMERY AND MAGILL, FEDERAL TAXES ON ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFTS, 1936-1937
(1936) 387 et seq. There are four major factors in such savings: (1) the gift tax rate
is 75% of the estate tax rate; (2) the amount of the tax itself is not included as part
of the sum taxed for gift tax purposes, although it is for estate tax purposes; (3) the
taxpayer is able to use the lower brackets of both estate and gift taxes; and (4) the
taxpayer under the gift tax gets additional exemptions.
4. U. S. TREAs. REG. 79, Art. 19(9). "The value of a life insurance contract . . .
is established through the sale of the particular contract by the company, or through
the sale by the company of comparable contracts." Gifts made prior to that regulation
were valued at the cash surrender value instead of at cost. Guggenheim v. Rasquin,
28 F. Supp. 322 (E. D. N. Y. 1939). Contra: Ryerson v. United States, 28 F. Snpp.
265 (N. D. Ill. 1939).
5. 27 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cf. 1939).
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must be included in the gross estate." The interval before a probable appea"
to the Supreme Court is an opportune time to examine the problems which
the Court may be called upon to resolve.
Opposing contentions in the Bailey case were drawn along two not very
clearly separated lines - statutory construction and constitutional interpreta-
tion. The Government, in construing the Estate Tax Law, relied on Section
302 under which
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by
including . . .
"(g) .. . the amount receivable (in excess of $40,000) by all other bene-
ficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the decedent upon his own
life."s
By its terms, the Government contended, this section required the inclusion
of all policies taken out by the decedent on his own life, irrespective of any
subsequent assignment. The taxpayer maintained that subsection (g) must
be construed in the light of subsection (a) under which there was to be
included in the decedent's estate all property
"(a) to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
death,"
and of Section 301 which imposed a tax of ascending rates upon the transfer
of the net estate.9 Since the decedent had irrevocably assigned all the inci-
dents of ownership, the taxpayer asserted, he had neither any interest in
the policies at the time of his death (302a), nor anything to transfer (301).
In support of his case the taxpayer might have gone outside the four
corners of the Statute. Since 1930, Treasury Regulations°,have clearly
indicated that the proceeds of irrevocable inter vivos transfers of insurance
6. Assignments of life insurance policies are subject to the gift ta. I:z. Rm-. CoD7x,
§ 1000 (1939). In the event that inter vivos transfers of such policies are included in
the gross estate for estate tax purposes, taxpayers who have paid the gift tax will he
entitled to a credit therefor. INr. REv. ConE, § 813 (a) (1939). It should be nAed that
in the Bailey case, the gift tax, although due, was never paid, and this fact-unmenti(ned
in either the Government's brief or the Court of Claims opinion-may have had some
weight in inducing the court to arrive at its conclusion. In the Bailey case, also, the
court found that the decedent had continued to pay the premiums on the plicies after
assignment. However, each premium payment should be treated as a taxable inter vivos
gift. U. S. TREas. REG. 79, Art. 2(6); Walker v. United States, 83 F. (2d) 103
(C. C. A. 8th, 1936) ; Paul, Life Insurance and the Federal Estate Tax (1939) 52 H.nv.
L. REv. 1037, 1075, n. 117. Consequently the result should not differ from that reached
in the instance of a gift of a paid-up policy. However, since a donor is exempt from
the gift tax on gifts up to $4,000 per beneficiary per year, [INr. RE . CoDE, § 103(b)
(1939)] he is able, unless the Bailey case is upheld, to escape all estate and gift taxes
on insurance policies immediately irrevocably vested in the beneficiary when the annual
premium is less than $4,000.
7. At present, plaintiff has pending in the Court of Claims a mt k n for a neV
trial. Communication to YALE LAW JOURNAL by counsel for plaintiff, Oct. 6, 1939.
S. INT. REv. CODE, § 811(g) (1939).
9. INT. Rv. CoDE, § 810 (1939).
10. U. S. TRxAs. REG. 70, Art. 27, as amended by T. D. 4296, IX-2 Cum. BuLL. 4.7
(1930) ; U. S. TaRAs. REG. SO, Art. 27.
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policies are not to be included in the gross estate. A fairly well-known canon
of statutory construction, affirmed only recently by the Supreme Court,11
holds that reenactment of a provision of the revenue lav by Congress after
it has been construed by the Treasury Department is an adoption of the
Department's construction. 1 2 For a variety of reasons, however, it seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court will apply this rule in the Bailey case. The
Regulations had been in force for only two years 13 at the date of transfer.
Furthermore, Section 302(g) was not expressly reenacted, unless reenact-
ment can be inferred from a failure to alter that section while other sections
of the Estate Tax Law were being amended.' 4 The taxpayer would have fared
better also, if he could have shown that the Regulations were affirmatively
before Congress 15 when the Estate Tax Law was revised.';
Erudite arguments over statutory construction of Section 302, however,
avoid the essential problem, for interpretation of the meaning of the various
clauses of Section 302 has always been influenced 17 by the constitutional
limitations which the Supreme Court has placed upon the scope of the estate
tax.18 Provisions of the estate tax have been sustained if they are directed
at a transfer at death 9 or if they are reasonably designed to prevent the
avoidance of the estate tax.20 It has generally been supposed that if an inter
vivos assignment of an insurance policy is properly executed by the imme-
diate and unconditional divestment of all the incidents of ownership, there
is no transfer at death. 2' It is true that a transfer sufficient to sustain the
11. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 423 (U. S. 1939).
12. United States v. Dakota-Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459, 466 (1933). But cf.
Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455, 467 (1934).
13. Iselin v. United States, 270 U. S. 245 (1926) (long-continued uniformity of
construction needed). In Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 59 Sup. Ct. 423
(U. S. 1939), the Regulations had been in force for at least nine years.
14. 47 STAT. 278 (1932).
15. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 288 U. S. 269 (1933).
16. A taxpayer who had completed a transfer after Feb. 10, 1939, the effective date
of the Internal Revenue Code, might make a more persuasive argument. Not only could
he point to an express reenactment [INT. REv. CODE, § 811(g) (1939)], but he could rely
on uniform interpretation for nine years.
17. "Grave constitutional doubts" frequently constrain the Supreme Court to construe
statutes narrowly so as to find no legislative sanction for a proposed levy.
18. The "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment.
19. Y. M. C. A. v. Davis, 264 U. S. 47 (1924); Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61
(1924); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927); Chase National Bank v. United
States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929). See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 348
(1929).
20. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935); HuMEs,
FEDERAL DEATH TAX (1938) § 3.
21. The Supreme Court has not heretofore passed upon the taxability of irrevocable
inter vivos gifts of insurance policies made subsequent to the enactment of § 302(g).
In Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U. S. 327 (1929), inclusion in the gross
estate was based on the right to change the beneficiary until death. Lewellyn v. Frick,
268 U. S. 238 (1925) ; Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211 (1935) ; and Industrial
Trust Co. v. United States, 296 U. S. 220 (1935) all concerned policies which were
transferred prior to the promulgation of § 302 (g). Belief that the transaction is exempt
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tax may be of an interest no greater than an "assurance passing from the
dead to the living," as in Porter v. Commissioner, where the settlor of a
trust reserved a power to change the beneficiary but expressly excepted any
change in favor of himself or his estate.2 2 The mere assurance at settlor's
death to the beneficiary was held to be a taxable testamentary transfer. But
where the beneficiary receives no such assurance, there is no passing of an
interest, even though the full enjoyment of the gift does not pass until after
death .3
In the Bailey case, as in the typical insurance assignment, the insured re-
tained none of the legal incidents of ownership; the right of the beneficiary
to immediate payment was merely dependent upon the occurrence of two
conditions beyond the control of the decedent-the donee's survival and the
death of the insured. Though the Court of Claims suggested that the death
of the insured was a necessary event "giving rise to the full and complete
possession and enjoyment of the face amount of the policies by the bene-
ficiarv," and that a taxable testamentary transfer had therefore occurred, -2
it is difficult to find any interest passing at death from the insured. While
it is of course possible that the Supreme Court may adopt this Court of
Claims theory, it has no foundation in existing Supreme Court case law which
uniformly indicates that the sine qua non of a testamentary transfer is not
the receipt at death of an interest by the beneficiary; it is instead, the passing
at death of an interest from the decedent.2
Genuinely disconcerting to taxpayers, however, is the possibility that the
Supreme Court might sustain Section 302(g) on the alternative ground that
it is "reasonably calculated to prevent avoidance of a tax." The legislative
history of that section could warrant such a construction of Congressional
intent G and this doctrine has been employed by the Court at least three times
previously to sustain the taxation at death of transfers apparently completely
vested during life. Thus, in Helvering v. Bullard the taxation at death of
inter vivos gifts wherein the donor had reserved a life estate was upheld.2
Similarly sustained was the levy in Hevcring v. City Bank, where the tax-
payer had retained the power to revoke or modify, to be exercised jointly
with a beneficiary, what otherwise would have been a completely vested
stems from lower court cases: Walker v. United States, 3 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A. Sth,
1936); Helburn v. Ballard, 85 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936); Guettel v. United
States, 67 Ct. Cl. 613 (1929); Chase National Bank, Executor v. United States, (94
C. C. H. 1937 Inh., Est. & Gift Tax Serv., V. 82,0 (Aug. 3, 1939) ; from U. S. Tar.zs.
REG. 70, Art 27, as amended by T. D. 4296, IX-2 Cum. BuLL 427 (1930); and frum
numerous B. T. A. decisions. See Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211, 219 (1935).
22. 288 U. S. 436 (1933).
23. Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 27S U. S. 339, 347 (1929), Cf. Shul:ert v.
Allen, 273 U. S. 545 (1927).
24. Bailey v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 617, 621 (Ct. Cl. 1939).
25. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 48, 49 (1900); Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 2,.4 U. S.
47, 50 (1924); Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U. S. 61, 63 (1924); Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U. S. 531, 537 (1927).
26. H. R. REP. No. 767 on H. R. No. 12863, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. (1918) 22 cited
in Marmaduke B. Morton, Administrator, 23 B. T. A. 236, 243 (1931).
27. 303 U. S. 297 (1938).
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inter vivos gift.28 Further, the Court perceives in cases involving gifts made
in contemplation of death an omnipresent hint of avoidance.2
Every inter vivos gift avoids the exaction of the estate tax. But so long
as Congress, by retaining on the statute books a less expensive gift tax
structure, encourages taxpayers to save taxes, the conventional inter vivos
gift cannot be regarded as opprobrious avoidance. The distinguishing element
in "odious" avoidance cases appears to be that the taxpayer has succeeded
in retaining, or has attempted to retain, as in Helvering v. City Bank, control
until death over a seemingly vested inter vivos gift, or, as in those cases
involving contemplation of death and reservation of a life estate, he has actually
managed to retain the fruits of his gift virtually until death. Most like the
Bailey case is Helvering v. City Bank, which rests upon the control theory.
There the settlor of a trust had reserved a power of revocation jointly with
a beneficiary. 30 In answer to the argument that the settlor had retained no
control, since the beneficiary's interest was adverse, 81 the Supreme Court
said that "Congress may well have thought that a beneficiary who was of
the grantor's immediate family might be amenable to persuasion or be induced
to consent to a revocation in consideration of other expected benefits from
the grantor's estate."23 2 The taxability of the transfer apparently rested on the
possibility that the donor might persuade a solitary beneficiary to revoke and
it might be said that the assignor of a life insurance policy would encounter
no greater task in securing a reassignment.
Such a rationale, however, cannot withstand close scrutiny, for the donor
of a simple cash gift might just as easily persuade the donee to return it.
The foundations of Helvering v. City Bank are probably more deeply-rooted.
More significant is the form of the alleged inter vivos gift. Thus the creation
of a trust hedged in by involved legal relations, including a possibility of
revocation, employed in Helvering v. City Bank, is not the usual and natural
way to make an outright transfer. The indications are strong that the donor
still hopes to work the strings of a puppet gift. From this point of view, it
would follow that an insurance policy would normally not be the subject of
a bona fide gift. By its very nature, insurance is associated with testamentary
disposition, 3 3 not with lifetime bounty. An insurance policy yields no taxable
income to the assignee. The unique value of insurance lies not in its stir-
render value, but in the full proceeds that become payable on death; the
28. 296 U. S. 85 (1935).
29. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15 (1931); United States v. Wells, 283
U. S. 102, 116 (1931); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 91
(1935).
30. Although the power of revocation was to be exercised jointly with the beneficiary
and a trustee, it was provided that in case of disagreement the beneficiary was to have
the final decision. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 87 (1935).
31. The argument that the beneficiary's interest was adverse carried weight in
Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 346 (1929).
32. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 90 (1935).




assignee's freedom to dispose of the policy is inhibited by the large sacrifice
of value which surrender entails.3 4
While the way is thus open for the Supreme Court to sustain the levy
to prevent an avoidance of the estate tax, conceivably the Court may reach
the same result by treating the exaction as a gift tax. In Hcizcrinug v. Bullard,
as an alternative basis for the decision, the Court argued that since Congress
has the power to classify gifts, so long as the segregation is not unreasonable
or arbitrary, and to tax the classes at different rates, it can use an estate tax
to lay an excise tax on some sorts of gifts.35 The Supreme Court may take
this opportunity, therefore, to demolish the barrier separating gift and estate
taxes.30 Whether it does this or uses the avoidance theory, the Court appears
to have ample leeway to sustain the Court of Claims.
On the other hand, the ultimate solution may not be a watchful and con-
tinual caulking of seams created in the Estate Tax Law by astute tax counsel.
Such policing will never catch the major item of avoidance - the ability to
get the estate into lower rate brackets by dividing it into two piles, one sub-
ject to the estate tax, another to the gift tax. At the present time, Congress
obviously countenances such avoidance for the sake of a policy designed to
encourage early distribution of wealth and quicker receipt of taxes.3T The
most effective plan to eliminate all avoidance seems to be either to substitute
an inheritance taxas for the estate and gift taxes, with all gifts and bequests
to each recipient cumulated, or to equalize the gift and estate tax rates while
basing the levy upon the sum total of all gifts and bequests. However, adop-
tion of either program entails an abandonment of the present early distribution
policy.
In the absence of such a thoroughgoing shift of policy, the duty is upon
the Treasury Department to preserve equality of burdens to tax payers within
any given bracket by attacking individual attempts to avoid taxes. In the eyes
of the Department the device of assigning insurance assets inter vivos has the
same decided testamentary flavor of avoidance3 9 which led the Court in
34. For the taxpayer it might be said that a gift of an insurance policy, unlike gifts
of stocks, does not have income tax reduction as a motive. There is no taxable income
from insurance but there are dividends from stocks, which often is a primary motive
for the gift.
35. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297, 301 (193S). But cf. Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U. S. 312, 330 (1932) ; Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 27S U. S. 339, 347 (1929).
36. The reasonableness of the classification might be more easily accepted by the
Court in the guise of a gift than under the designation of avoidance.
37. Explanation of Representative Crisp, Acting Chairman of Committee on Ways
and eans, 75 CoNG. RC 5691 (1932).
38. Cf. Altman, Combining the Gift and Estate Taxes (1933) 16 TAx I, . 259;
and the complex bill introduced in 1935 which would have created side by side an inheri-
tance and an estate tax, with gift taxes complementing each. L R. No. S974, 79 Co:x.
REc. 12,301 et seq. (1935).
39. Another inequity, from the Department's point of view, is the taxing of the
policy at its "reproduction" value [see note 4, supra], leaving untaxed the difference be-
tween the gift tax value and the ultimate proceeds of the policy. This inequality alone,
however, does not warrant a decision which would divorce insurance assets from the
gift tax statute; the unfair advantage over other gifts could be remedied by levying
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Helvering v. City Bank and Helvering v. Bullard to include in the gross
estate the assets there transferred. 40 The Bailey case, if upheld, would elim-
inate the potential unfair advantage of that class of taxpayers which possesses
insurance assets. But it is ironic that within the large class owning such
assets a Supreme Court decision which would imprison insurance policies
inside the walls of the estate tax will not equalize tax opportunities. Instead,
the decision would not be as likely to affect the healthier, wealthier taxpayer
as the one less fortunately situated. The former can take advantage of the
saving afforded by the present dual structure by transferring other available
assets; the latter may not have wealth enough to transfer, or health enough
to escape a somber contemplation of death.
"MEIN KAMPF" AND THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY PROPERTY
OF STATELESS PERSONS*
THE phenomenon of statelessness, or lack of citizenship in any state or
nation, while legally of little significance prior to 1920,1 has been known
to European law for at least a century.2 Formerly, a loss of citizenship was
inflicted as a penalty for engaging in the slave trade,3 or for desertion from
the armed forces ;4 now, however, it is imposed for such elastic reasons as
"racial impurity" or any "conduct contrary to the duty of fidelity to the
an income tax on the increment in the hands of the beneficiary, or by valuing the transfer,
under the gift tax statute, at its ultimate proceeds.
40. The assumption that the assignment of an insurance policy is in the nature of
a testamentary transfer is at least debatable in the light of the decision in Shukert v.
Allen, 273 U. S. 545 (1927). The postponement in that case of the enjoyment by the
cestui of the proceeds of the trust until after the death of the settlor seems no less
testamentary in nature than the delay of enjoyment under an assignment of a policy, the
full proceeds of which are, of course, available only upon the death of the insured. If,
as in Shukert v. Allen, the transfer in question is not a substitute for a testamentary
transfer, then "the mere desire to equalize taxation cannot justify a burden on some-
thing not within congressional power." Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 540 (1927).
The court might distinguish Shukert v. Allen, however, on the ground that although the
enjoyment passed after the settlor's death, the trust was created without reference to tile
time of death. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339, 347 (1929). But the
intention of the settlor that the enjoyment pass after his death might be inferred from the
fact that such enjoyment would not pass until his hoped-for eighty-sixth year.
*Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939),
cert. denied, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1939, p. 44, col. 7.
1. Stoeck v. Public Trustee. [1921] 2 Ch. 67.
2. Preuss, International Law and Deprivation of Naltionality (1935) 23 Go. L.
Rtv. 250, 257.
3. French decree of April 27, 1848. Preuss, id., n. 28.
4. Such provisions are not uncommon in the penal codes of the principal nations.
For the United States statute, see 8 U. S. C. §§ 11, 12 (1934), adopted in its original
form March 3, 1865, 13 STAT. 490.
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Reich and people." 5 As a result, many novel problems have been presented
to the courts in the endeavor to determine the degree of legal protection
afforded the lives and property of over tAo million persons who have suffered
denaturalization since the World War.
One of these problems, that of what copyright protection, if any, is forth-
coming under federal laws to the stateless individual not domiciled in the
United States at the first publication of his works, was raised in a recent
case arising over the copyright on Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf.0 The issue
of statelessness was injected into the case because, although not generally
realized, the Reichsfuehrer himself was without a country at the time his
book was first published.
7
The publishing firm of Houghton Mifflin purchased the American rights
to Hitler's book in 1933 from the German publishers who had obtained a
copyright for that work in this country in the years 1925-1927. The contract
of assignment included provisions whereby royalty payments of 10 to 15
percent were to be made to the author.8 While Houghton Mifflin's edition
was in the process of preparation. the defendants, Stackpole Sons, Inc.,
announced their intention of issuing an unauthorized version of the same
work, and publicly proclaimed that no royalties would be paid the author.0
In the ensuing litigation, Stackpole Sons defended their position on the
ground that Hitler was not within any of the classes for whose benefit the
copyright laws were enacted.
The Copyright Act, in defining those persons who are entitled to its pro-
tection, lists "the author or proprietor of any work made the subject of
copyright by this title.' ' 0 The sentence immediately following provides that
5. German ordinance of July 26, 1933. Preuss, supra note 2, at 252.
6. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons. Inc., 1R4 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939), cert. dcnied, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1939, p. 44, col. 7.
7. Hitler, an Austrian, having enlisted in the German army in 1914, .as unable to
respond to the Austrian call to military service in 1917, and thereby lost his citizenship.
At various times between 1918 and 1932, when he acquired German nationality, Hitler
publicly and under oath declared himself to be stateless. Record on Appeal, pp. 0-35.
The certificate of copyright on the first volume of Mein Kampi, issued in 1925, gave the
author's nationality as that of "stateless German." Hitler's stateless condition was so no-
torious in Germany that he was used as the classic example of the man without a country.
H. LESSING, 12 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA DtSsERTAMlONI IVs LNT:M rTIO:AU. ILLUS-
TRAXTItrM (1937) 241.
S. Record on Appeal, pp. 10-15 where contract is set out in full.
9. This was an extremely popular feature ',f the infringing copy, \%hich despite its
lack of the annotation possessed by the authorized edition was accorded a 4 to 1 con-
sumer preference. Record on Appeal, pp. 26-29, 42-3. The ratio is based on a urvey
conducted by Brentano's.
10. 35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 8 (1934). "The author or proprietor of any
work made the subject of copyright by this title, or his executors, administrators, or as-
signs, shall have copyright for such work under the conditions and for the terms specified
in this title: Provided, however, That the copyright secured by this title shall extend to
the work of an author or proprietor who is a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation
only: (a) 'When an alien author or proprietor shall be domiciled within the United
States at the time of the first publication of his work; or (b) When the foreign State or
nation of which such author or proprietor is a citizen or subject grants, either by treaty,
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copyright shall be extended "to the work of an author or proprietor who is
a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation only" when reciprocal privi-
leges are extended to Americans by the state of which he is a citizen. The
problem to be decided by the court was whether the definition of persons
included within the scope of the Act was a comprehensive grant of protection
limited only as to citizens of non-reciprocating nations, or whether the quali-
fying phrase was one of delimitation, excluding all aliens, except those who
were citizens of reciprocating nations."' The circuit court, conceding Hitler
to be stateless, held that Congress had extended the protection of the copy-
right laws to everyone except citizens of states failing to grant like privileges
to Americans, and remanded the case to the district court with directions
to issue the injunction as requested.
12
In the United States, the exclusive right of an author to control the multi-
plication and sale of his literary works is dependent entirely upon statute.13
This protection, known as copyright, is granted to American citizens, to
those aliens who are resident within the United States at the time of the
first publication of their work, and to citizens of foreign nations which grant
equal privileges to American nationals.1 4 Heretofore the non-resident alien's
right was thought to be dependent upon the existence of a copyright treaty.10
If copyright protection in America is extended to non-resident aliens only
by treaty, then stateless persons, citizens or subjects of no state or nation,
are without copyright protection.'0 However, if copyright protection is given
to stateless persons by the municipal law of this country, their lack of rights
created by international law is immaterial.
Although this case was the first to decide the exact point in issue, whether
stateless aliens are entitled to copyright, a similar problem has previously
been raised by that section of the Copyright Act which safeguards music
mechanically reproduced. This section, slightly different in wording from the
literary clause, provides that the protection granted "shall not extend to
convention, agreement, or law, to citizens of the United States the benefit of copyright on
substantially the same basis as to its own citizens, or copyright protection, substantially
equal to the protection secured to such foreign author under this title or by treaty; or
when such foreign State or nation is a party to an international agreement which provides
for reciprocity in the granting of copyright, by the terms of which agreement the United
States may, at its pleasure, become a party thereto. The existence of the reciprocal con-
ditions aforesaid shall be determined by the President of the United States, by proclama-
tion made from time to time, as the purpose of this title may require."
11. Houghton Mifflin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 306, 308 (C. C. A. 2d,
1939), cert. denied, N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1939, p. 44, col. 7.
12. The district court had previously refused a preliminary injunction to restrain the
defendants upon the ground that such grave doubt had been cast on the validity of the
plaintiff's copyright that a decision could not be reached on the basis of affidavits alone.
Record on Appeal, p. 131.
13. Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591, 662, 663 (U. S. 1834); Banks v. Manchester, 128
U. S. 244, 252 (1888) ; Thompson v. Hubbard, 131 U. S. 123, 151 (1889).
14. 35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 8 (1934).
15. See note 19, infra.
16. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lauterpacht's ed. 1937) 508, 533, § 312.
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the works of a foreign . . . composer unless the foreign state . . . of which
such . . . composer is a citizen . . . grants . . . to the citizens of the
United States similar rights." 17 It has been held that, under this section,
citizenship in a state granting reciprocal privileges to Americans is a condi-
tion precedent to the existence of a right by an alien to enjoin the unlicensed
mechanical reproduction of his musical compositions.' 8 The difference in
wording in the two sections seems unintentional, and it is probable that
Congress, at the time of the Act's passage in 1909, was impelled by the same
motives in both cases.
The interpretation of the Act adopted by the court in the Mein Kapf
case, though syntactically sound, is unique and contrary to the leading treatises,
both native and foreign, upon the subject of American copyright law.20 The
intent of Congress, as revealed in the Congressional Record and in the
Committee Reports, was to afford copyright privileges to non-resident aliens
in cases of reciprocity only.20 Previous court decisions have clearly recog-
nized that the motive for extending the privileges of copyright to aliens was
that of inducing foreign countries to grant American citizens similar privi-
leges.2 ' Sheer altruism has played an astonishingly small part in the various
amendments to copyright legislation. The rules of the Copyright Office,
prepared by the Register of Copyrights with the approval of the Librarian
of Congress as provided by law, likewise hold citizenship in a nation granting
reciprocal rights to be a condition precedent to the issuance of a copyright
certificate to an alien non-resident.
22
17. 35 STAT. 1075, 1076 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 1(e) (1934).
18. Portuondo v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 36 U. S. P. Q. 104 (S. D. N. Y. 1937).
For domiciled aliens, the rule is otherwise. rucordi & Co. v. Columbia Graphophone Co..
258 Fed. 72, 76 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
19. 2 LADAS, THE INTERIATIONAL PRoTEcrioN or LIrnAnv AD AnlsTic Propi-
(1938) 703, 840; WEre, AmiEc.N COPYRIGHT LAW. (1917) 25S-9, 260-1; CorzXnER, TM
LAW OF COPYRIGHT (7th ed. 1936) 33, 327; Bowrmn, CopvirnT, ITS HISTO Y AZD ITS
LAw (1912) 109-110; PUTNAm. THE Qt, ESTION oF CoPYurInT (2d ed. 1996) 162;
A.IUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTIcE (1936) 575-6; DENVoL, A-. OuTI:ME Or CoP-.-
RIGHT LAW (1925) 263.
20. REPORT OF THE HousE Co Irrr ON PATEN-TS ON THE INT MIATIONAL COPY'-
RIGHT BILL OF 1S90-91 submitted by Hon. W. E. Simonds of Conn. to accompany H. IL
10S81, set forth in PUTNMA, THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 18M) 77-130, esp.
77-8. For the present act, see H. R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), adopted
verbatim in Szx. REP. No. 110S, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). Little or no discussion was
had on the floor, all differences having been threshed out in committee. This report, re-
ferring to the present Copyright Act, said "in section 8 of the bill we provide for recipr c-
ity regarding copyright generally, excepting only, . . . an alien who is domiciled wfithin
the United States at the time of the first publication of his works." p. 9.
21. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U. S. 236, 243 (1909) ; Merriam Co. v. United
Dictionary Co., 146 Fed. 354, 358 (C. C. A. 7th, 1906), aff'd, United Dictionary Co. v.
Merriam Co., 20$ U. S. 260 (1903). The principal case itself recognizes this motive.
Houghton iffin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 306, 309 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
22. 17 U. S. C. A. § 53, and Rules and Regulations 2 (1), immediately follo-ing,
which implement the statutory grant of power.
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In discarding the interpretation of the Copyright Office2= and the text
writers, the court felt itself justified 24 by what it regarded as the historical
course of federal copyright legislation in this country. A lengthy review was
made by the court of the efforts during the last century to extend copyright
to foreign authors, whose cause had been espoused as early as 1837 by
Henry Clay and Daniel Webster. The interest of many prominent diplomats,
statesmen and writers had been engaged and success finally achieved. A
closer examination of this history reveals much, however, that might be
urged as an argument for the opposite view. Copyright protection on a
national scale was first afforded American citizens and aliens resident within
this country in 1790.23 During the ensuing century, a dozen changes were
made, but none enlarged the class of persons entitled to protection so far
as nationality or residence was concerned.2 6 In fact, despite repeated urgings
to protect non-resident aliens, a bill of this nature, though first accorded a
vote in Congress in 1840, was not passed until 1891.27 A quid pro quo was
and always has been considered essential to the granting of protection to
non-resident aliens.
2 8
The sole exemption which Congress interposed to this insistence upon
reciprocity was that of the alien resident in the United States at the first
publication of his works.2 9 Former acts extended copyright to aliens "resi-
dent" in the United States, for which the present act substituted the term
"domiciled" in the United States.30 Both words have been construed to
mean permanent settlement in this country with intent to remain.31 Until
23. The certificate of the Register is only prima facie evidence of the existence of
copyright. Unlike the Patent Commissioner, the Register of Copyrights is a purely min-
isterial official who cannot undertake to adjudicate the rights of rival claimants. All ques-
tions of copyright validity must be left to the determination of the courts. Everson v.
Young, 26 W. L. R. 546 (D. C. Sup. Ct., 1889); BowxFm, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORv AND
ITS LAW (1912) 96; PUTNAM, THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1896) 31-2,
24. "Great weight will be given to contemporaneous construction of an act of Con-
gress by department officials, who are called upon to act under and carry out its provi-
sions, particularly if there be uncertainty or ambiguity." Brewster v. Gage, 30 F. (2d)
604, 606 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
25. 1 STAT. 124, c. 15 (1790).
26. REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION BY TIlE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (1904) 11,
12-17; BoWKER, COPYRIGHT, ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912) 35-37.
27. Bentley v. Tibbals, 223 Fed. 247, 249 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915) ; PUTNAM, THE QuEs-
TION OF COPYRIGHT (2d ed. 1896) 40 et seq.
28. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U. S. 236, 248 (1909) ; BowNER, COPYRIGHT, Is
HISTORY AND ITS LAW (1912) 108; AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE (1936) 579.
29. 35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 8(a) (1934).
30. Copyright privileges were extended to any "citizen or citizens of these United
States, or resident therein" by the original act of May 31, 1790. 1 STAT. 124, c. 15. The
present statute extends copyright to "an alien author" when he "shall be domiciled with-
in the United States." 35 STAT. 1077 (1909), 17 U. S. C. § 8(a) (1934).
31. "Residence ordinarily means domicil, or the continuance of a man in a place,
having his home there . . . In order to constitute residence, it is necessary that a man
should go to a place, and take up his abode there with the intention of remaining, making
it his home." Boucicault v. Wood (C. C. Ill. 1867) Fed. Cas. No. 1, 693 at 991. For a
like definition of "domiciled" under the present Act, see Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia
Graphophone Co., 258 Fed. 72, 74 (S. D. N. Y. 1919).
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recent years, most aliens making their permanent home in America planned
to become citizens, so this exemption in favor of resident aliens, dating from
1790, is readily understandable;32 but the same reasoning cannot be applied
in the case of the stateless non-resident.
The court was able to cite but one legal precedent supporting its belief
that the statutes afford copyright protection to everyone except the subjects
of foreign states denying reciprocal privileges to American citizens.m In 1904
Attorney General Moody held that citizens of the Philippine Islands were
not barred from obtaining copyright protection within the United States. In
reaching this decision, he reasoned that the Filipino could not properly be
considered "a citizen or subject of a foreign state or nation." This being
the case, American copyright was available to him, Moody maintained, because
it is forbidden only to aliens not the subject of a reciprocating foreign state?34
Caution should be exerted in adopting Moody's conclusions to support a,
different factual situation, for it must be remembered that the Attorney
General's opinion dealt with the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, a
"territory under our exclusive sovereignty."5 Whatever the exact position
of the thirteen million Filipinos in relation to the United States,-^ the term
"stateless" can hardly be applied to them.3r
However, if Moody's reasoning be taken as a precedent, Hitler may also
be brought within the protection of the Copyright Act on the theory that,
being the citizen of no state, he cannot be properly be considered the subject
of a state denying Americans reciprocal privileges. In terms of the wording
of the Act itself, considered apart from all history or policy, this view is
quite proper. Throughout the Copyright Act the terms "alien" and "citizen
or subject of a foreign state" are used interchangeably. This confusion is
32. See BowKER, COPyRIGHT, ITs HISTORY AND ITS LAyw. (1912) 109 for an inter-
esting if not thoroughly satisfactory explanation of this exception.
33. 25 OPs. Arur. GEN. 179 (1904).
34. Id. at 181. In reaching his decision, the Attorney General expressly overruled
two former opinions on the same point 22 Ors. ATvr. GEx. 269 (ISQS), and 25 Or .
Am. GEN. 25 (1903).
35. "Internationally, they [the Philippines] are a part of the United States; that is
to say, territory under our own exclusive sovereignty. But their relations with our own
legal system are determined by other than international principles." 25 Ors. A'rrv. Gn..
25, 26 (1903).
36. The status of the Filipino has been analogized to that of American citizens, and
his country treated as American territory by one line of decisions and opinions: Dorr
v. United States, 195 U. S. 13S (1904) ; 24 Ors. A=iv. GEn. 27 (102) ; 24 Ors. Ars'.
GEx. 120 (1902) ; 25 Ops. AT-. GEN. 131 (1904) ; 2: Ors. Aviv. GE x. 179 (1904) ; 27
Ops. ATr. GEN. 623 (1909) : 28 Ops. Aw-. GE-. 422 (1910). Another line of opinions
has treated the Philippine Islands as though a foreign land. or their inhabitants as
aliens: 23 Ors. AvTY. Gzx. 370 (1901) : 25 Ors. Ary. Gn..x. 25, -7 (1903), re-aff'd, id.
182 (1904); 25 Ors. Am-. GEx. 127 (1904) ; 26 Ops. A-m. GE.-. 355 (1907). See also
Hale, Copyright in Porto Rico and the Philippines (1916 2 PHIL. L. J. 20. Great
care must be exercised in extending precedents based on the unique status of Philippine
citizens to situations involving stateless aliens.
37. McGovney, Our Non-Citizen Nationals. Who are They?, LEG AL EsSA'ys I:: Tnt-
BnuE To Oanix Kip MMcfTRunwY (Radin & Kidd ed. 1935) 323.
19391
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
due to the fact that statelessness, as a world problem, dates from about 1920. s
Prior thereto, all aliens, practically speaking, possessed citizenship in some
foreign country. It is possible that Congress, had it encountered the problem
of statelessness when the Act was drawn, might expressly have included the
stateless alien within the Copyright Law. The fact remains that the issue
was not raised, and it is highly improbable that Congress realized it was
leaving a grammatical loophole. However, from the standpoint of strict
logic the loophole was clearly there, and the court did not hesitate to avail
itself of the fact.
In reaching its decision, the general position of the refugee was a factor of
weight with the court, which apparently felt that should the decision be adverse
to the Hitler copyright, "it would mean that stateless aliens cannot be secure in
even their literary property."3 9 This view may well be somewhat too pessi-
mistic, for all stateless aliens either domiciled in the United States, or possessed
of citizenship in some foreign nation granting reciprocal rights to Americans
at the thne of the first publication of their work were already fully protected.40
It was only the relatively rare non-resident refugee who published a book after
termination of his former citizenship and before becoming domiciled in the
United States who was unprotected. To this individual, the instant case now
affords a legal right to enjoin infringement.
Although the court's opinion is clearly contrary to the trend of authority,
41
it is difficult to see how the same result could have been reached by any
other rationalization. Undeniably it would have been more convenient to
reach the same end by treating Hitler as a citizen of the state in which he
had last possessed membership, but to attempt to utilize such a concept
would be to ignore the established tenets of international law. 42 By the
terms of the Copyright Laws, protection is extended to a citizen of a foreign
state only so long as that country reciprocates in kind. In actual fact, the
present German Government does not grant full reciprocal privileges to the
38. For examples of this confusion see Ricordi & Co. v. Columbia Graphophone
Co., 258 Fed. 72, 76 (S. D. N. Y. 1919), and 28 Ors. ATrY. GEN. 222 (1910) where a
copyright question concerning "aliens" is answered in terms of "citizens or subjects of a
foreign state or nation." For one of the few who grasped the real issue see WEIL, AMnR-
ICAN COPYRIGHT LAW (1917) 261-262.
39. Houghton Miffin Co. v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 104 F. (2d) 306, 309 (C. C. A.
2d, 1939).
40. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW (1925) 171.
41. "The very fact that each of these sections [35 STAT. 1077, 1080, 1080-81 (1909),
17 U. S. C. § 8, 23, 24 (1934)] enumerates with such particularity the persons who may
exercise the privilege of securing copyrights and having them renewed and the order
in which the right vests, and that in these particulars the sections materially differ from
each other, shows that the persons enumerated are exclusive of all others and that it
was not the purpose of Congress to confer the right upon any person or persons not
therein specifically mentioned." 28 OPs. Anr'. GEN. 162, 165 (1910). See also note 19,
supra.
42. Citizenship is the creature of municipal law of each state and must be determined
by the laws of the land of origin. Stoeck v. Public Trustee, [1921] 2 Ch. 67, 82; HAIL,
INTFRNATIONAL. LAW (8th ed. 1924) 275; BORCHARD, DIPLOMA'rc PROTECTION OF CrTI-
ZENS ABROAD (1916) § 4.
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NOTES
citizens of this country, for American authors and composers of Jewish
faith are denied the protection of their literary and artistic property which
is afforded other Americans in Germany. 3 The spirit of reciprocity, if not
the printed terms of the copyright treaty, has been violated by the German
Government. Fortunately, or unfortunately, the courts are precluded from
examining into this point because the presidential finding that reciprocity
does exist is conclusive evidence of that fact until withdrawn by superseding
findings.
44
Had the court wished to do so, it might have denied the validity of the
Hitler copyright without passing at all upon the issue of statelessness. This
could have been done by turning the case off on the grounds that no assign-
ment of the rights by the author to the German publisher had been shown.
Inasmuch as Houghton Mifflin failed to trace their claim of title back to the
author, the decision below could have been affirmed and the question of
statelessness wholly ignored. In this fashion, the position of the stateless
author in general would not have been prejudiced in the slightest, the attention
of Congress could have been called to the entire question of protecting the
stateless aliens literary property, and Hitler's copyright monopoly would
have been destroyed.
From the general tone of the opinion, and the failure to dismiss the appeal,
upon the ground of faulty title, it might be deduced that the court was anxious
to avoid offending the leader of a great and friendly power. But more
probably, its primary concern was to discover a plausible ground for uphold-
ing the Hitler copyright, since it felt this case presented an ideal situation
for establishing new protection for stateless refugees generally. Though tile
average author without a country seems in little danger of suffering from
the infringement of his works in the United States, at the present time,4 1
it cannot be denied that this buttressing of the protection already afforded
the refugee was probably desirable.
43. Hearings before Comninittee on Foreign Relations on S. w9:8, 73d Co-ng., 2d Sess.
(1934) 9495.
44. For a holding squarely in point, see Chappell & Co., Ltd. v. Fields, 210 Fed. S9,
866 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914).
45. The obscure stateless author is not endangered by the literary pirate h2cause
no market for his works exists. Even today 85 per cent of the books published in Eng-
land are not copyrighted within the United States because a separate printing would
not be justified on a purely cost basis. Hcarings before Coinitee on Foreign Relations
on S. x923, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 15-17. Toward the well known refugees whose
works sell readily, the American public is sympathetic, and probably no important pub-
lisher would risk appearing before that public in the guise of one stealing from the
homeless.
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PEACEFUL PICKETING ON WORLD'S FAIR GROUNDS
AS DISORDERLY CONDUCT*
PROMINENT among a series of judicial rebuffs to which peaceful picketing
has lately been subjected' is a decision of the Magistrate's Court of Flushing,
New York, finding thirteen strikers guilty of disorderly conduct for peace-
fully picketing a private restaurant concession on the World's Fair grounds.2
The court's opinion illustrates an old judicial technique which achieves the
desired result by assuming the chief issue in the case as its major premise.
Magistrate Hockert first takes it for granted that the World's Fair grounds
belong within an absolute category known as "private property." Then, on
the strength of this assumption, the magistrate is able to show as if inevitable
that admission to the Fair is a mere license revocable at the licensor's whim,
and that the peaceable refusal of the pickets to obey the request of the Fair
police to leave the grounds constitutes the criminal offense of disorderly
conduct. That the result of the case depends upon this a priori assumption
is shown by the magistrate's concession that no offense would be made out
had the picketing not been on "private property."3
The few cases which relate to labor activities on private land treat the
problem on the bases of the type of property, the manner of its use, and the
nature of the labor pressure rather than on categorical grounds. Thus a
violent incursion into a factory or onto mining property has been held a
trespass.4 Even peaceful picketing and persuasion have been forbidden where
*People on Complaint of Koester v. Rozensweig et al., 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 795 (Mag.
Ct. 1939).
1. Busch Jewelry Co., Inc. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22
N. E. (2d) 320 (1939) (violence in picketing held to forfeit right to picket at all; see
criticism in (1939) 8 I. J. A. BtLL. 12) ; American Federation of Labor v. Bain, (1939)
4 LAi. REL. REP. 824 (Oregon anti-picketing statute held constitutional; case now ol
appeal) ; Minnesota v. Cooper, 285 N. W. 903 (1939) (peaceful picketing of employer's
home in protest of discharge of chauffeur held disorderly conduct) ; Fornili v. Auto
Mechanics Union, (1939) 5 LAD. REL REP. 61 (Wash. 1939) (temporary cessation of
picketing held to have terminated "labor dispute" making subsequent picketing illegal) ;
People v. Bellows et al., 281 N. Y. 67, 22 N. E. (2d) 238 (1939) (peaceful picketing in
furtherance of illegal secondary boycott held disorderly conduct). But see People v. Har-
ris, 91 P. (2d) 989 (1939).
2. People on Complaint of Koester v. Rozensweig et al., 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 795
(Mag. Ct. 1939). Defendants paraded before the Brass Rail Restaurant, a privately
owned concession in the Metals Building at the New York World's Fair on Friday
afternoon, May 19, 1939, wearing 3" x3" cards in their lapels and white jerseys under
their jackets on which were stencilled "Brass Rail on Strike." The Fair police ordered
the defendants to leave, dffering to refund the price of their tickets. On their refusal,
the police arrested the defendants who, after a night in jail, were released in $500 bail
each. N. Y. Times, May 20, 1939, p. 9, col. 5; N. Y. Times, May 21, 1939, p. 38, col. 8.
3. See People on Complaint of Koester v. Rozensweig et al., 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 795,
796 (Mag. Ct. 1939).
4. See National Labor Relations Board v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S.
240, 253 (1939) (violently seizing employer's buildings and ousting owner held unlaw-
ful) ; Rex. v. Reners [1926] Can. Sup. Ct. 499 (violent invasion of mining property by
pickets held trespass).
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the property is devoted to personal and exclusive uses, such as a private
factory, store, hallway, ship, private dock, or an enclosed and restricted resi-
dential development.5 But where the property is actually a place of public
resort, courts have not been disturbed by difficulties as to who holds the title
to the land. Where abutters own to the center of a street, injunctions against
picketing on the sidewalk have been denied on the ground that the public
easement of passage includes the right to picket peacefully.( The National
Labor Relations Board has ordered an employer to desist from ejecting
organizers from its company town, even though it owned the fee to the streets,
on the ground that the town form of existence gave to the company's tenants
and their visitors, including labor organizers, the privilege to use the streets
free from that type of interference.7 Similarly, anti-injunction statutes permit
picketing "any place where any person or persons may lawfully be. ' s
The magistrate's absolutistic treatment of "private property" has failed to
follow the factual approach of the cases in the field. The Fair grounds cer-
tainly cannot be regarded as a private close. The land upon which the Fair
is situated is owned by New York City as a public park.0 Built from the
swamp and dump stage by municipal funds,10 the park is leased rent free
to New York World's Fair, 1939, Inc.," a tax-exempt'- educational insti-
tution whose profits go to the city and state of New York for public pur-
poses.' 3 The taxpayer's stake in the Fair is a large one: $26,700,000 of its
5. Webber v. Barry, 66 Mich. 127, 33 N. W. 289 (1807) (entering saw-mill to in-
duce employees to join strike held trespass) ; Foster v. Retail Clerks International Prot.
Ass'n, 39 'Misc. 48, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860 (Sup. Ct. 1902) (pickets enjoined from entering
store); 'cCusker v. Smith, [1918] 2 Ir. R. 432 (entering into a hallvay to shop to
dissuade customers held wrongful besetting); The Oakmar, 20 F. Supp. 650 (D. Md.
1937) (peaceful sit-down strike on ship held unauthorized withholding of possession);
Larkin v. Belfast Harbour Comm'rs [1908] 2 Ir. R. 214 (speaking on private dock with-
out permission held not justified by statute permitting peaceful picketing "at or near
a place where a person . . . carries on business . . .") ; Sea Gate .Association v.
Sea Gate Tenants Ass'n, 168 Misc. 742, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 387 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (injunction
granted against residents of private development picketing in protest against beach charge
on basis that landlord had right to forbid picketing on his property. See (1938) 7 I. J.A.
Bum.. 26 for severe criticism of this holding which represents the limit to which "private
property" in picketing cases has been pushed).
6. Vonderschmitt v. McGuire, 100 Ind. App. 632, 195 N. E. 585 (1935) ; see Robi-
son v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local No. 782, 35 Idaho 418, 432, 207 Pac. 132,
135 (1922).
7. Harlan Fuel Company and United 1Mine Workers of America, S NLRB 25
(1938).
8. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT 876-a; see 38 ST.%T. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. r 52 (1934);
Trade Disputes Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 47, § 2.
9. T~m FLUSMING M1xuow IDO IHOvMMENT (New York City Department of Parks),
'May 15, 1939, p. 10.
10. Tn FLUSHING1 Mz Ow IMPROVEMENT (New York City Department of Parks),
'May 15, 1939, p. 6.
11. See Agreement of Lease between the City of New York and New Yorl: World's
Fair 1939 Incorporated, June 29, 1936.
12. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 727.
13. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 544; N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1935, p. 10, col. 1; N r,'svTr:,
June 19, 1939, p. 22.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
funds come from New York City, together with $6,200,000 from the state
and $3,000,000 from the Federal Government. 14 All New York motorists
have without choice advertised the Fair on their license plates.1' Instead of
being restricted to the private pleasure of a few, the grounds have been fre-
quented for five months by over 100,000 persons a day,
10 all cajoled to the
Fair by intensive advertising and executive proclamation. 17 That a uniform
admission fee is charged does not alter the Fair's public nature.'
8
The Fair functions as a municipal corporation.' 9 By statute, lease, and
charter, the state and city have delegated to it the power of governing an
area of 1216 acres.20 It maintains its own police force with power of arrest,
operates its own fire department, and drafts its own health, building and
sanitary codes which supersede the New York City regulations. " It is exempt
from the payment of unemployment compensation and of property, income
and sales taxes,22 from the jurisdiction of National and State Labor Relations
Boards, 23 and from state control over its acquisition and resale of water, gas,
and electricity.2 4 None of these privileges are granted to ordinary private
enterprises; they are governmental functions delegated by the state only to
its municipal agents.
2 5
Since the Fair is an organization with functions municipal in nature, its
attitude toward labor disputes within its jurisdiction to which it is not a
party should be that of any municipality toward such disputes,-" except
14. TnE FLUSHING MEADOW IMPROVEMENT (New York City Department of Parks),
May 15, 1939, p. 10.
15. N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 12.
16. TiME, Aug. 21, 1939, p. 30.
17. N. Y. Times, May 1, 1939, p. 1, col. 8. Proclamations of President Roosevelt,
Governor Lehman and Mayor La Guardia are reprinted in Tuni, June 1939, p. 4. For
a collection of the Fair's publicity and propaganda, see New York World's Fair Collec-
tion, Yale University Library.
18. See Minneapolis v. Janney, 86 Minn. 111, 115, 90 N. AV. 312, 314 (1902). The
line of cases upon which the court relies for the statement that the Fair might eject any
patron at pleasure specifically exempt an amusement franchised by the state. See Com-
mercial Telegram Co. v. Smith, 47 Hun 494, 507 (N. Y. 1888) ; People ex rel Burnham
v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 185, 82 N. E. 169, 171 (1907) ; Collister v. Hayman, 183 N. Y.
250, 255, 76 N. E. 20, 21 (1905) ; Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 216, 111 N. E.
829, 830 (1916).
19. See 1 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) 834.
20. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 544; Agreement of Lease between the City of New York
and New York World's Fair 1939, Inc., June 29, 1936; N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1935, p.
10, col. 1.
21. N. Y. Laws 1936, c. 544.
22. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 727.
23. NEWSWEEK, June 19, 1939, p. 22. See Harding, World's Fair, New York (July
1939) 179 HARPERS 193, 198.
24. N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 727.
25. 1 MCQUILLIN, 'MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928) 421, 825, 828, 833; see
also Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U. S. 141, 147 (1889); McMahon v. Savannah, 66
Ga. 217, 224 (1880).
26. See People v. Arko et al., 40 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 149, 154, 199 N. Y. Supp, 402,
405 (Sp. Sess. 1922); WITTE, THE GOVERNIENT IN LABOR DisPITEs (1932) 305.
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insofar as its functions as a fair set limitations on that attitude. Any deter-
mination, either by the Fair itself or by a court, as to whether given picketing
were proper would require a balancing of interests: the interest of workers
in peaceful picketing weighed against both the public's interest in forgetting
workaday troubles in the escapist atmosphere of the World of Tomorrov
and the Fair's interest, as a business enterprise, in the public's not being
kept away by labor strife. Perhaps labor disputes are less welcome at a fair
than on an ordinary business street; the public has come primarily to be
entertained and educated by the passing show. - T Moreover, bondholders of
the Fair, far more than ordinary municipal bondholders, have an interest
in avoiding disturbances which will deter paying customers from attending.
A frank recognition, however, of the interests of the public and of the Fair
in preserving a carnival atmosphere on the grounds does not compel the
non-recognition of another factor: that workers at the Fair, no less than
their brothers outside, should have the right to strike,2 and that picketing
-which aims to discourage patrons,20 to persuade other workers to join the
strike,30 and to ascertain what employees are still at work 31- is a traditional
weapon of strikers. To be successful it obviously must be carried on near
the employer's premises. If strikers must picket outside the Fair's gates
nearly a mile from the restaurant, as the court's decision requires, the right
to strike is a toothless prerogative. Spiking labor's big guns of publicity and
persuasion,32 while leaving the employer free to use the lockout, strike
breakers, and other weapons of industrial warfare, is playing heavy favorites
in an economic struggle in which the courts are foresworn to impartiality.3
The concessionaire deserves no immunity from the lawful manifestations of
labor disputes merely because he locates within the Fair's gates. This has
been recognized by New York courts in a number of cases which uphold the
right to picket a private concession on park property despite anti-picketing
regulations of the Parks Department.34
27. However, it should be noted that at least a part of the public attending the Fair
probably wish to be fully informed about labor conditions and controversies in places they
patronize, and might find this interest paramount even to their desire for rela.-mtion.
28. See Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 317 (C. C. A. 7th, 1894) ; Birmingham Tru-t
and Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. and A. Ry., 271 Fed. 743, 745 (N. D. Ga. 1921) ; O.%T-u,
ORGANIZED LABOR AND INDUSTRIAL CONinIc'rS (1927) 419.
29. New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552 (19,3); Goldfingcr
v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910 (1937); Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78,
166 Atl. 566 (1933).
30. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 1I4
(1921); Walter A. INood Mowing & Reaping Machine Co. v. Toohey, 114 Mi.c. 185,
186 N. Y. Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1921).
31. Iron M1oulders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 Fed. 45 (C. C. A. 7th, 1903).
32. See Tippr, WHEN SouTHvaR LABOR STMs (1931) 233, stating "the real con-
test of the strike takes place on the picket line."
33. See Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 409, 182 N. E. 63, 65;
Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 84, 166 AtI. 566, 568 (1933).
34. People v. Ribinovich, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 135 (Sp. Sess. 1939) (although a con-
cession vas located on a city-owned boardwalk it was given no immunity from picketirg,
despite regulations forbidding placards and signs, since the fact that the city is landlord
19391
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A sound policy for places of public amusement such as the Fair might be
one which allowed no more obtrusion of mundane labor matters into the
public's holiday mood than was necessary to protect strikers' interests: in-
nocuous picketing by striking members of the Fair community should be
permitted, but picketing connected but indirectly with local activities should
not. There is not the same justification for unions carrying on jurisdictional
battles or secondary boycotts on the Fair grounds that there is for picketing
by local workers whose dispute arises wholly on Fair property. The use, for
example, of a sound truck, bicycle or strong language in picketing, practices
which have been permitted on public streets, 35 would interfere, no doubt, with
patrons' enjoyment of the Fair.36 But the conduct of the pickets in the prin-
cipal case was not of such character. They walked quietly on a wide pedestrian
avenue with the simple message "Brass Rail on Strike" printed on 3" x 3"
cards worn in their lapels or stencilled on jerseys worn under their jackets.
This does not seem too much out of keeping at a Fair which is spangled with
barkers, weight guessers, penny stampers and similar attractions.
The inequity of the result reached in the principal case is emphasized by
its employment of a criminal sanction. In skipping light-footedly over warning
precepts which have grown up about New York's disorderly conduct statute 1
to find peaceful strikers guilty of the offense,38 the magistrate is adding the
"may not be used as a shield by a private business man against a recognized and lawful
industrial weapon.") ; People v. Mario Marletti, unreported, discussed in (1935) 3 I. J.
A. BULL. 12, 2; People v. Fernandez, People v. Antolini, People v. Robert, People v.
Rosado, unreported, discussed in Memorandum on Behalf of Defendants' Motion to Dis-
miss the Complaint, pp. 16-18, People on Complaint of Koester v. Rozensweig, 13 N. Y. S.
(2d) 795 (1939) ; cf. Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 59 Sup. Ct. 954,
964 (1939) (use of streets and parks for communication of views on national questions
held privilege of citizen of the United States).
35. Kirmse v. Adler, 311 Pa. 78, 166 Ati. 566 (1933) (pickets have same right to
use automobile with music-producing box as any merchant) ; Dehan v. Hotel & Res-
taurant Employees, 159 So. 637 (La. 1935) (picketing with tandem bicycle permitted) ;
Walter A. Wood Mowing & Reaping Mach. Co. v. Toohey, 114 Misc. 185, 186 N. Y.
Supp. 95 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (permitting pickets to use "common strong every day lan-
guage of laboring men."). But see Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 286, 11 N, E.
(2d) 910, 912 (1937) (use of loudspeaker held illegal as intimidating).
36. Promulgation by the Fair of a formal set of regulations informing unions what
activities are permissible would avoid the unpleasantly ad hoe procedure of the Fair
police in the instant case.
37. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 722: "Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of
the peace, or whereby a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the fol-
lowing acts shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct . . .
2. Acts in such a manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive
to others."
38. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 22, People v. Knapp, 206 N. Y. 373, 99 N. E. 841 (1912)
(crimes and offenses limited to those named specifically in Penal Law; bare neglect of
duty not a crime unless provided by statute) ; People v. Perry, 265 N. Y. 362, 193 N. E.
175 (1934) (criminal assault held not disorderly conduct since occurred in private place
where no likelihood of breach of peace or public alarm) ; People v. Pieri, 269 N. Y. 315,
199 N. E. 495 (1936) (intent to breach peace essential to prove disorderly conduct
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weapon of "private property" to the store of a developing anti-labor pro-
cedure: the evasion of anti-injunction statutes by use of minor criminal
offenses.30 Picket lines may be broken as effectively by mass arrests with a
night in jail, high bail, and abuse of unlimited powers of police courts over
petty offenses as by labor injunctions. The dangers in adding peaceful
picketing, on what a magistrate chooses to call private property, to this class
of offenses are clear. If the court's theories as to private property should
be followed, businesses located in galleries, arcades, terminals, company towns
and other places of public resort will be able to use police to break up strikes
and lawful demonstrations. Expansion of this doctrine may lead to em-
ployers being able to build for themselves a Shangri-La free from labur
troubles by locating within real estate developments, anmusement parks or on
private streets.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FAIR TRADE ACTS*
ANALYSIS of judicial efforts in interpretation of state Fair Trade Acts'
reveals a trend toward the notion that these statutes were primarily designed
for the protection of trade-mark owner's property rights in their trade-names.
Adherence to this concept, established as authoritative by the Supreme Court
in the celebrated Seagram case,2 has been graphically illustrated by a recent
New York decision.3
charge); People v. Wecker. 246 N. Y. Supp. 708 (Sp. Sess. 1930) (disorderly comduct
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by clear evidence.
Refusal of pickets to comply with an arbitrary order of p lice to muve on is not dis-
orderly conduct. Compare People v. Arko. 40 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 149, 199 N. Y. Suppo.
402 (Sp. Sess. 1922) xith People v. Galpern, 259 N. Y. 279, 181 X. E. 572 (1932) (rc-
fusal to obey policeman whose order is not arbitrary and is calculated to promote public
order held disorderly conduct).
39. WITrE. THE GOVERXMENT I- LA, R Dispur'TF (1932) 150; Pichetingi :Is Is-
orderly Conduct in re-w York. (1935) 4 . J. A. BtLL. to 1; Note (1930) 36 011- L
R v 153.
* Lentheric. Inc. v. W. T. Grant Co., 257 App. Div. 348. 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 169 (1st
Dep't 1939).
1. Fair Trade Acts are in operation in forty-three states, and challenges of their
validity have been resolved in their favor. Old Dearboni Co. v. Seagram Corp., 29 U. S.
183 (1936); The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U. S. 193 (19361; Bourjois Sales
Corp. v. Dorfman, 273 N. Y. 167, 7 N. E. (2d) 30 (1937) ovcrrnlinq Doubleday, Dran
v. R. H. ' Macy, 269 X. Y. 272. 199 N. E. 409 (1930) ; Weeo Products Co. v. Reed Drug
Co., 225 WNisc. 474, 274 N. W. 426 (1937).
2. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp.. 299 U. S. 183 (1930).
3. Lentheric v. Grant. 257 App. Div. 348, 13 X. Y. S. (2d) 169 (lbt Dep't 19391.
Several other cases of substantially similar factual background have arisen. De Voin v.
\V. T. Grant Co.. 13 CALIF. S. B. J. No. 3, 20 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1938); Guerlain v. VWAi-
worth, 170 -Misc. 150, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 886 (Sup. CL 1939); Lentheric v. F. W. WVu:A-
worth Co., 35 Adv. Sheets, Pa. Dist. and Cty. Rep. 572 (Pa. C. P. 1939). In Grierldin v.
Woolworth an injunction pendente lite wvas granted to the plaintiff, but at the subsequent
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Lentheric, Incorporated, a distributor of luxury perfumes owning and
having exclusive right to registered trade-marks used to identify its products,
entered into contracts with numerous retail distributors pursuant to the
provisions of the Feld-Crawford Act.4 The agreements provided that the
retailer would not sell within the state certain perfumes at prices lower than
the minimum resale prices in effect at the time of such sale. Price schedules
were drawn up by the plaintiff Lentheric to supplement these contracts and
were issued to the trade. The four ounce container of a popular toilet water
or eau de cologne was priced at $1; two ounces, at 75 cents; and one ounce,
or any quantity less than one ounce, at 50 cents. The defendant W. T. Grant
Company, a low-price chain emporium not party to any such contracts, but
with full knowledge that these contracts had been made, thereafter acquired
certain ampules of this eau de cologne containing less than one-fifth of an
ounce of the liquid, which third persons had prepared by rebottling a supply
obtained from sources unknown to Lentheric. Grant sold these small vials
to the public at 10 cents each.5 In a 3 to 2 decision, the Appellate Division
granted Lentheric an injunction against further sale by Grant of products
bearing the former's trademark at prices less than those already stipulated
or to be stipulated in the future.
Citing the Seagram case, the court expressly based its decision on thc
premise therein developed, that the purpose of the Fair Trade Acts was
protection of manufacturers' good will embodied in trade-marks.0 That such
a premise is highly,questionable becomes obvious upon examination of the
circumstances surrounding the passage of this legislation. The Fair Trade
Acts were largely an outgrowth of agitation on the part of independent
retailers, rather than of manufacturers, 7 and their enactment was made pos-
trial on the merits it was denied with a rather abrupt reversal of reasoning on the part
of the court. Guerlain v. Woolworth, Prentice-Hall, 1939, Fed. Tr. and Ind. Serv.,
1197,024 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1939).
4. N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 976, p. 1902, as amended, Laws 1938, c. 14.
5. Section 2 of the Feld-Crawford Act provides: "Willfully and knowingly adver-
tising, offering for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price stipulated in any
contract entered into pursuant to the provision of section one of this act, whether the per-
son so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such contract, is
unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged thereby."
6. In the Seagram case Justice Sutherland made what is rapidly becoming a classic
statement of the purpose of the Fair Trade Acts: "The primary aim of the law is to
protect property-namely, the good will of the producer, which he still owns. . . . It
proceeds upon the theory that the sale of identified goods at less than the price fixed by
the owner of the mark or brand is an assault upon the good will, and constitutes what
the statute denominates 'unfair competition.'
7. Manufacturers supported the idea in the early part of the present century; but a
general apathy replaced this interest, until the movement was revived by retailers and
crowned with success in the depression years 1931-36. Surveys of producers' sentiments
conducted at the time of passage of the acts revealed either lack of acquaintance with
the scheme or general disinterest, except in the case of drug manufacturers, whose inter-
est was probably dictated by strong organizations of their retail outlets rather than by
spontaneous concern on their own part. See Grether, Experience in California with Fair
Trade Legislation Restricting Price-Cutting (1936) 24 CALiF. L. REV. 640, 647; Grether,
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sible, or at least accelerated, by the demoralization of prices during the depres-
sion and the attendant high mortality rates among independent enterprises.8
They were primarily instigated as remedial measures for the elimination of
predatory price-cutting and "loss-leader" practices, particularly prevalent
among the relatively small, but well organized interests engaged in distributing
drugs and cosmetics.9 Proponents of the acts stressed the idea of protecting
the manufacturer's trade name, partly because of the historical origin of the
idea' 0 and partly with an eye to its greater appeal to a sense of fairness as
well as to judicial logic. The true purposes of guaranteeing dealer's margins
and reducing the competitive advantages of chain and department stores were
minimized and, if mentioned at all, were pointed out as tending to preserve
the American ideal of liberty and individual enterprise." Such concepts were
essential to overcome judicial prejudice against price-fixing legislation.' 2 So
summary was the enactment of the statutes in most states that no positive
Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in Relation to the Control of Price Competition
(1937), 4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 375, 384; 'McLaughlin, Fair Trade Acts (1933) 85 U.
OF PA. L. REv. 803, 815; Wolff, 4 Tr~Du REG. R v. (1937).
S. Considerable sympathy was felt for the "little fellow" in this Verud and moti-
vated the passage of many other acts designed to benefit him. See McAllister, Price
Control by Law in the United States (1937) 4 LAW & Co:zrm.tw. Pno. 273, 296. This
sympathy cleared the way for enactment; and, strangely enough, the property interest
of the big business "ogre" was the basis for judicial endorsement.
9. The Feld-Crawford Act is a copy of the California statut% but many states accept-
ed a revision of that act made by the National Association of Retail Druggists, perhaps
the most powerful single element of the lobby which exerted pressure in favor of this
legislation. See McLaughlin, op. cit. supra note 7, at 816-817. For a detailed comparison
of these acts in the several states see Merrell and Kittelle, Analysis 4f State Fair Trade
Laws (Oct. 1937) Du's RExvIw 8. In a survey made in 1929 by the Federal Trade
Commission, 2,334 out of 3,000 replies to questionnaires sent to 36,C00 retailers on the
subject of resale price maintenance, were used in tabulating results in this field. Of thece
1,385, or close to 60%, were from druggists, 96% registering replies favorable to such
legislation. Report of Federal Trade Commission on Resale Price Maintenance (1929)
pt. I, 77-78. A particularized discussion of druggists' tactics in Califurnia is to Ue found
in GRETHER, PalcE CONTROL UNDER F.u R TRADE LyGiSLATION (1939) 83-105. Of longest
standing and greatest omnipresence as an opponent of the acts was R. H. Macy Com-
pany, now in close company with other department stores, the cut-rate independents and
the chains. For an interesting line-up of lobbyists in the hearings on the M11iller-Tydings
Bill, see Hearings before Subcommnittee on the Judiciary on S. ico, 75th Congress, 1st
Session (1937), and Hearings before Subcommittee on the Judiciary on H. R. i6zi,
75th Cong., 1st Session (1937).
10. See note 7, supra.
11. For such tactics in the advocacy of the Miller-Tydings Bill see House Hearings,
note 9, at 3-4. An invective by R. H. Macy's economist during these hearings deplores
the political activities of the drug interests. House Hearings 141-142. His somewhat
biased tirade is not too much out of line with the facts, however. See Grether, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 83-106.
12. Opinions striking down the Fair Trade Acts are primarily founded upon dis-
taste for price-fixing laws, and those upholding their constitutionality find this question
most troublesome. See cases cited in note 1, supra, and Comment (1937) 50 HAnv. L
REv. 667.
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indicia of legislative intent can be found other than the willingness of the
lawmakers to endorse the acts in the form advanced by their proponents."3
Ignoring this background, the court in the instant case held that the
emphasis of the acts was upon protection of the trade-mark owner's property
right in his brand, and concluded that the "spirit of the law" required it to
find for Lentheric. The basis for this determination was a lengthy citation
from the authoritative source of the fallacy, the Seagram case.14 Employing
the majority's tenet of liberal construction, it is equally logical to reach the
opposite result, on the sounder premise that the true purpose of the acts was
to eliminate destructive price competition. The defendant was not cutting
prices on a proportional unit basis; further, Lentheric was using the resale
price maintenance device as a protection for its own trade name, rather than
in the interests of its retailers. Hence it might be argued the New York Statute
was not designed to protect the plaintiff in the instant situation at all.1" On
the other hand, results of using rigid statutory construction appear to be
similarly flexible; and such treatment is, as could be effectively contended,
more in keeping with the fundamental rule that an act which is in derogation
of the common law should be strictly construed."; Taking this approach,
the dissent emphasized the absence of any express provision in the Act
authorizing a seller to limit the quantity in which his goods may be resold, 11
and therefore came to the conclusion that Lentheric could not expect protec-
tion from the practices complained of. This view loses sight of the fact that
in any case Grant has the right either to strip the goods of the trade-mark
and sell them in any amounts and at any prices desired"' or to sell any
13. The speed with which the acts were railroaded through some state legislatures,
including that of New York, is borne out by the fact that two serious typographical
errors in the California Act, § 1, the word "content" and § 1 subsec. 2, the phrase "in
delivery," were copied into subsequent legislation in 10 other states. For a complete col-
lection of the texts of the statutes see WEIGL, THE FAIR TRADE AcTs (1938) 89-160.
14. Old Dearborn Co. v. Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 193-195 (1936).
15. This argument was clearly expressed in Guerlain v. F. W. Woolworth reported
in Prentice-Hall, 1939 Fed. Tr. & Ind. Serv., 1197,024 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) although
the reasoning of the principal case, decided after the writing of a portion of the Guer-
lain opinion but before the handing down of the decision, was held controlling. The
injunction was nevertheless denied for failure of the plaintiff to show damage, which
was held to be essential under the provisions of the act.
16. Resale price maintenance under Fair Trade Acts goes somewhat beyond that per-
mitted by the common law, particularly as sanctioned by § 1%/ of the California law, of
which § 2 of the New York law is a copy and upon the basis of which the plaintiff in the
principal case sought his remedy. See Elliott, Fair Trade and Resale Price Maintelance
(1936) 10 So. CALIF. L. Rrwv. 1, 11-13.
17. The dissent, making the erroneous assumption that Lentheric was attempting to
prevent resale in small quantities at any price whatsoever, relied heavily on Prestonettes,
Inc. v. Coty, 264 U. S. 359 (1924), in concluding that such a restriction was illegal. But
even if this assumption had been correct, the case was not in point because the opinion
expressly stated that it was "not a suit for unfair competition" and the basis for the
action was the federal trade-mark laws, and not a fair trade statute.
18. The existence of this right has not only been recognized by the courts but has
been a persuasive factor in moving the courts to sustain the validity of the acts and to
grant relief under them. See Mr. Justice Sutherland's remarks in Old Dearborn Co. v.
Seagram Corp., 299 U. S. 183, 195 (1936).
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quantities it pleases under the trade-mark, provided it charges at leas t 50
cents therefor.
An equally plausible and apparently sounder view is that, in the absence
of an express provision prohibiting the stipulation of unreasonable resale
prices, the plaintiff was empowered fo enforce a minimum price of 50 cents
on all quantities of his product smaller than one ounce, if such was its wish."-
Unless it be contended that the Act provided a standard of reasionableness
to regulate the level of prices which might be maintained under its aegis,
Lentheric cannot be said to be violating any of its terms. Where extrinsic
evidence of legislative intent is inadequate to answer questions of statutory
construction, even greater reliance than usual must be placed upon the literal
terms of the act. In the phrasing of the Statute itself, it is clear that the
legislature placed no limits upon the resale prices set and relied upon economic
factors to keep prices in line.20 There is no sign of legislative intent to
prevent individual price policies from having their normal effect upon the
market or to deny the individual any benefit of such consequences as may
be expected from the operation of the Statute in conjunction with economic
factors. The device here used by Lentheric is not revolutionary, but its
specific application is almost unprecedented. High price policies to assure
distribution of luxury products through high class retail outlets are nut a
new idea, though their effectiveness has been increased by the Fair Trade
Acts.2 ' There is no question but that commodities which are not susceptible
19. This view has been accepted in two lower court decisions squarely in lpoint %with
the principal case. De Voin v. AV. T. Grant Co.. 13 C.LiF. S. B. J. No. 3, 20 (Cal. Super.
Ct. 1938); Lentheric, Inc. v. F. Wl. Woolworth Co., 35 Adv. Sheets. Pa. Dist. & Cty.
Rep. 572 (Pa. C. P., 1939). In the De T'oin case, at 21, judge Wilson -aid: "The rela-
tion of the retail price to the actual value is of no consideration."
20. Section 1, subdiv. 1, of the Feld-Crawford Act reads "'No contract relating to
the sale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or content of vhich bears, the
trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or owner of such commodity and which is in
fair and open competition (italics ours) with commodities of the same general class pro-
duced by others shall be deemed in violation of any law of the state of New York by
reason of any of the following provisions which may lie contained in such contract: (there
follow certain provisions and exceptions thereto)." Since the word "price" is barren of
descriptive adjectives throughout the remainder of the statute and the emphasis in the
above section is upon the Safeguard of competition, there is clearly nothing in the terms
of the statute which justifies any inference that it regulates the level of prices %, hich
may be set. The legislature relied upon competition among manufacturers to provide a
natural check upon price increases. See ZORN AND FELDMAN, BUsINErS tThI.ii TIIE Panlk
LAws (1937) 290-291.
It can hardly be maintained that the legislature intended to cast the courts in the role
of rate-making bodies by this legislation. Of all the acts, only that of Wi~c,,nsin pro-
vides for hearings as to the reasonableness of the prices fixed, and there the hearings are
conducted by an administrative body. Wis. Laws 1935, c. 52, § 7.
21. The applicability of the acts in this respect wvas not even questioned in such fact
situations; litigation centered rather upon the validity of the acts. See cases cited in
note 1, supra. However, in the exercise of equity discretion, a New York court has talen
a different view where conditions of a business were deemed so chaotic that the enforce-
ment of a contract against one retailer would have had only an infinitesimal effect in
stabilizing the industry. Kline, Inc. v. Davega-City Radio, Inc., 168 Misc. 185, 4 N.Y. S.
1939]
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to repackaging in smaller quantities can be protected by fixing the unit resale
price.22 On the other hand, an article such as perfume, being easily divisible
and salable in small quantities, cannot be so protected unless the price scale
set is high in reference to small amounts. 23 Any tendency which the Statute
may have toward removing the inequalities arising from the natural differ-
ences between these two classes of products is not in itself undesirable, though
it may possibly be open to criticism on other grounds.
Thus, even though the result reached by the court in the principal case
appears to be a desirable one, its reasoning would have been more persuasive
had it gone into the question whether or not the Act provided a standard of
reasonableness for the resale prices set. So far, however, application of the
reasoning evolved in the Seagram case does not appear to have led the courts
to inequitable results.24 This is due to the fact that ever acting as a limitation
on the unreasonable extension of this concept is the common law doctrine
against restraints on alienation of chattels, with its roots firmly embedded in
the idea that the subjects of commerce should be freely transferable.2 6 Even
assuming that the courts adhere to their questionable derivation of legislative
intent, it is probable that unusual and highly unreasonable restraints
20 will
be struck down by common law concepts, and that such restraints as will
inhere in everyday business transactions supplemented by the effects of the
statutes27 will be protected on the basis of the Seagram case.
(2d) 541 (1938). Denial of an injunction here would seem to be refusing to enforce where
enforcement is the most necessary.
22. It is difficult to imagine how, for example, a retailer could successfully alter an
automobile and sell it for a lower price than one set in a resale price maintenance contract.
23. Otherwise the product is susceptible to an attack such as took place in the prin-
cipal case, whereby good will may suffer even in the absence of price-cutting in the sense
of the word as ordinarily used.
24. See cases cited in note 3, supra. In addition, see Portchester Wine and Liquor
Shop, Inc. v. Miller Bros. Fruiteries, Inc., 253 App. Div. 188 (2d Dep't 1938) ; Bristol-
Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc., 6 A. (2d) 843 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1939). The dissent in the lat-
ter case reveals the danger of undue emphasis upon the property right of the producer.
25. See Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels (1928) 41 HARV. L. Rsv. 945, 981-
987.
26. For example, in the case of automobile "trade-ins," abuse in granting exhorbitant
allowances, in so far as they amount to indirect price concessions, would constitute valid
grounds for an injunction, whereas efforts to enforce a rigid price scale for such allow-
ances would fail, as being an attempt to fix the selling price of an article (the trade-in)
in which the producer has no property right whatsoever.
27. Such could include requirements that a given article be resold at one price if sold
in combination with another article and at a different price if sold alone; they could in-
clude requirements of fixed interest rates on time payment sales and fixed service guaran-
tees on articles. Considerations which should move the courts to uphold or strike down
such restrictions are whether or not the devices are simple, easy to enforce, or customary
in the particular trade.
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OBLIGATION OF DEVISEES AND HEIRS TO PAY RENT FOR USE
OF DECEDENT'S REALTY-
THE feudalistic roots of real property law are visible in the zeal with which
the common law has protected the interests of the landed aristocracy. During
the administration of an estate, the decedent's heirs and devisees were sur-
rounded until the nineteenth century by the same legal safeIuards that kept
his creditors away during his lifetime. Even when the decedent's land was
later made available to creditors,-' it was still protected to the extent that
personalty had to be exhausted before a forced sale would he permitted. 3
Since the common law vests title to a decedent's real property in his devises
or heirs at the moment of his death,4 the latter have been regarded as exclu-
sively entitled to all rents and profits pending settlement of the estate, Where
realty in the possession of a third person today is not specifically devised.
the heirs, in the absence of statutory change, still collect the rents 6 and tale
equal shares.7 If the personal representative has received the rents, he i-
liable to the heirs,s even though he has applied the pro ,eeds to just claims
against the estate.9
*Limberg v. Limberg, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 690 (App. Div. 2dl Dep't 1939): ; A re
Limberg's Will. 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 897 (App. Div. 2d Dept 1939).
1. Realty at common law could not be subjected to the payment oi a dccedent's
debts, except where he by a contract under seal had expressly bound the realty ir
this purpose. 3 HOLiiSWORTH, Hism0a" OF ENGLISH L.W (3d ed. 1921 575-576: 2 Tir--
FAN-Y, R,.L ProPnr-Y (2d ed. 1920) § 552.
2. Realty was first subjected to -ale for payment of a decedent's detts by meang
of the creditors' bill and later by empowering the personal representative t0o make the
sale. 2 TIFFAxY. REAL PROPERy (2d ed. 1920) §552. The power o the pcr ,.nal
representative to sell real estate for the benefit of creditors, when nCt given to him
in a testator's will, is solely statutory; it can be exercised only on literal c.,mpliamwe
with the terms of the statute and is generally conditioned cn obtaining a court o'rder
of sale. 3 WOEoRN.-ER, A xM.luCA LAW Or ADmxixxs7rxiox (3d ed. 1923) § 463.
3. Proceeds from realty may usually be applied to debts tnly after personalty has
been exhausted. But some states authorize court orders applying the prceeds from
realty before personalty where in the opinion of the court it is necessary to protect the
value of the personalty. 3 NVOER.NER, A'MERTCA.,N LAw OF AwimfisfATown (3d cd. 11)23)
§ 489.
4. 2 BL. COMM. --201.
5. Head v. Sutton, 31 Kan. 616, 3 Pac. 280 (1884); Gibson's Adm'r v. Gibon,
241 Ky. 74, 43 S. W. (2d) 343 (1931); Lobdel v. Hayes, 78 Macs. 23G (1855g);
2 X0o xER, Amsi.c.x LAWk, OF Aminmsm' Iozi (3d ed. 1923) § 276.
6. Nicely v. Howard, 195 Ky. 327, 242 S. V. 602 (1922).
7. Rents received by one heir from realty in possession of third rers,,us were
made apportionable among all the heirs by an early statute. 4 A cN,. 16, § 27 (1705 .
See note 24, in ra.
8. The personal representative is universally held acco.untable f.r rents received
by him. Where under the law of the state he has no authority to collect rent;, ccurti
are not agreed as to whether he is liable in his official capacity or as agent of the
distributees. 3 WERNEn, A. mlc.x L.tw OF ADIuxsT=.Io: (3d cd. 1923) § 513.
Compare Conger v. Atwood, 28 Ohio St. 134 (1875), with Head v. Sutt,,n, 31 Nan.
616, 3 Pac. 280 (1884).
9. McClead v. Davis, 83 Ind. 263 (182).
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Although the distinction between realty and personalty has been preserved
by limiting the control of the personal representative over realty while allow-
ing him virtually complete freedom in administering personalty,' 0 the policy
which fathered the distinction has now become extinct. New considerations
have arisen, however, to justify a maintenance of the differentiation. In view
of the losses inevitable in a forced sale of realty and of the greater market-
ability of personalty, an estate is managed more efficiently when the personal
representative is required to exhaust the personalty before he turns to the
realty. Furthermore, unlike realty, personalty is easily dissipated and needs
a greater degree of protection.
There is one important situation, however, in which control over realty
by the personal representative, broader than was permitted at common law,
benefits both the estate and its creditors. Where the estate is insolvent, a
power in the personal representative to collect rent from the realty and to
use it in reducing estate debts may forestall an eventual sale of the realty
and will in any event provide additional funds for the security of creditors.
With this situation in mind, the legislatures of many states have discarded
the common law rule in favor of placing these powers of rent collection and
management in the hands of the personal representative."
While this type of statute has been effectively utilized to preserve the
estate's realty and to protect creditors, its application to situations where
these objectives are non-existent has resulted in confusion. Two recent New
York cases,12 arising from the administration of the same estate and argued
before the same court, have emphasized the problem of applying such statutes
to the collection of rent from beneficiaries of solvent estates.
A, an heir of T, was appointed executor at the time T's will was admitted
to probate.' 3 On appeal, the will was declared invalid,14 A's letters testa-
mentary were revoked, and B was appointed administratrix in his stead.
During the period of A's service as executor and after the appointment of B
as administratrix, A remained in possession of a part of the estate's real
property. The Surrogate Court charged A on his account as executor with
rent for use and occupancy of the real property while acting in his representa-
10. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 487.
11. Section 123 of the New York Decedent Estate Law is typical of these statutes:
"The administrator of a decedent . . . shall have power to take possession of the
real property of such decedent, and any interest therein, and to manage the same and
collect the rent thereof." Section 13 makes similar provision as to executors. States
having statutes comparable to New York's are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and
Wyoming. Missouri and Mississippi provide that the personal representative may obtain
a court order for the collection of rent upon showing the insolvency of the estate.
12. Limberg v. Limberg, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 690 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939); In re
Limberg's Will, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 897 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939).
13. The will was denied probate upon jury trial in the Surrogate's Court. The
decision was reversed by the Appellate Division. Matter of Limberg, 252 App. Div. 779
(2d Dep't 1937). A was thereupon qualified as executor.
14. Matter of Limberg, 277 N. Y. 129, 13 N. E. (2d) 605 (1938), rc'g, 252 App.
Div. 779 (2d Dep't 1937).
[Vol. 49
NOTES
tive capacity.Y5 The appellate division, however, unanimously reversed the
surrogate's decree, stating as its only reason the following: "A distributee
in possession may not be charged in this proceeding for use and occupancy
of a portion of the common property." 1  Shortly thereafter, in a separate
action before the same court B was permitted, as administratrix, to collect
rent from A for his use and occupancy of the realty subsequent to her ap-
pointment ;17 and this notwithstanding a stipulation by both parties that the
personal property was sufficient to meet all possible debts of the estate plus
costs of administration. The court reasoned that since the language of the
statute was unqualified,' 8 the right which it vested in the administratrix was
likewise unqualified, and hence she could collect rents even though the estate
was solvent. Two of the five judges, however, dissented and construed the
statute as in derogation of common law, vesting in the administratrix a
contingent right only, conditioned on the need for funds to pay claims against
the estate.
These separately considered decisions would seem to indicate this: while
an ordinary heir in possession is now bound to pay rent to a personal repre-
sentative regardless of the estate's financial condition, an heir who is himself
a personal representative is under no obligation to pay rent to a solvent estate.
The position taken by the appellate division in the second case with respect
to the personal representative's absolute right to collect rents from the bene-
ficiaries of a solvent estate is not in accord with the usual interpretation of
similar statutes by other courts.' 0 The right conferred on the persunal repre-
sentative is commonly limited to situations in which he can show that rent
is needed to satisfy debts of the estate,20 although a minority of the states
15. The Surrogate's decree is not printed in any official report. See In re Limberg's
Will, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) S97 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939).
16. In re Limberg's Will, 11 N.Y. S. (2d) 897 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939). It does
not appear from the opinion on what grounds the court made its decision. The words
"may not be charged in this proceeding" suggest that he might be liable in some other
proceeding. It is difficult to imagine what proceeding this might be except an action
on the theory of cotenancy.
17. Limberg v. Limberg, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 690 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1939). Note that
pursuant to § 548 of the New York Civil Practice Act a controversy submitted to the
Supreme Court on an agreed statement of facts is tried by the Appellate Division.
18. NEW Yoax DEC. EsT. LAw § 123, supra note 11.
19. But there are indications that Oklahoma, Connecticut and California would
follow suit were the e-xact issue presented to them. Nolan v. Mathis, 147 Old. 155, 295
Pac. 801 (1931), is distinguishable on the grounds that the distributee -vas also a lessee
of the decedent. See Lockwood v. Tracy, 46 Conn. 447, 453 (1878) ; Washington v.
Black, 83 CaL 290, 293, 23 Pac. 300, 301 (1S90). The Connecticut statute is unique in
expressly providing that the income from real property shall vest in the personal repre-
sentative as personal property. CoxN. GE-z. STAT. (1930) § 4956.
20. Palmer v. Steiner, 68 Ala. 400 (1880); Johnson v. Moxley, 22 Ala. App. 1,
113 So. 651 (1926) ; Mayo v. Bank of 'Marvel, 1M Ark. 330, 65 S.WNV. (2d) 549 (1933).
Where the party sought to be charged with rent is an heir ur devisee in p~sces i.,n,
courts are even more emphatic in their requirement of showing insolvency. St,vall v.
Clay, 108 Ala. 105, 20 So. 387 (1895); Hovard v. Patrick, 38 .Mich. 795 (1878);
Tunnicliff v. Fox, 68 Neb. 811, 94 N. AV. 1032 (1903) ; Russell v. Adams, 293 S. W. 2A
1939]
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do not require such a showing where persons other than heirs or devisees
are in possession.2 The requirement of a showing of insolvency is predicated
on the assumption that the preservation of the realty for the protection of
creditors is the sole purpose of the statute.2 2 Since this consideration is non-
existent where the estate is solvent, the fiduciary's employment of the statutory
power in such a case would serve no useful function. He would merely collect
rents from the heirs and devisees, extract additional commissions therefrom,
and return the balance to them upon settlement of the estate.
The limitation on the personal representative's right to collect rents is
opposed by an argument founded on a rule of cotenancy. As a practical matter
the heirs are not likely to make joint use of all the common property during
the administration of the estate. Inasmuch as they are in the legal position
of cotenants, 23 they are not entitled to contribution from one of their number
for his exclusive use and occupancy of common property.24 They may obtain
the cash value of their equal rights to possession, therefore, only if the
personal representative has the power to collect rents and distribute them
proportionately as assets of the estate.
This argument ignores, however, the fact that the cotenancy rule is out-
moded. While the rule of non-contribution between tenants in common for
use and occupancy may be justified where a cotenant has derived benefit
from common property through his own labor and initiative, 2 1 obviously
(Tex. Civ. App. 1927) ; cf. Rough v. Womer, 76 Mich. 375, 43 N. W. 573 (1889) ; Holt
v. Anderson, 98 Ga. 220, 25 S. E. 496 (1896). Georgia is the only state whose statute
expressly differentiates between the obligations of third persons and distributees in
possession. GA. CODE (1933) §§ 113-907, 113-908.
21. Washington v. Black, 83 Cal. 290, 23 Pac. 300 (1890); Nichols v. Dayton, 34
Conn. 65 (1867) ; Miller v. Hoburg, 22 Minn. 249 (1875). Arizona, California, Colorado,
Nevada, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming have mandatory statutes providing that
the personal representative "must take" or "shall take" possession and/or collect rents
from the decedent's realty. Under statutes which are not mandatory in form it may be
the representative's duty to collect rent if the estate is insolvent. Clark v. Knox, 70 Ala,
607 (1881); see Matter of Baker's Estate, 164 Misc. 92, 94, 298 N. Y. Supp. 261, 265
(Surr. Ct. 1937).
22. Streeter v. Paton, 7 Mich. 341 (1859); Rough v. Womer, 76 Mich. 375, 43
N. W. 573 (1889).
23. Heirs at law are cotenants of the decedent's realty. Cruger v. McLaury, 41 N. Y.
219 (1869); Fenton v. Miller, 94 Mich. 204, 53 N. W. 957 (1892); 1 TiFrANY, RrAL
PRo ER-Y (2d ed. 1921) § 193. Devisees are made cotenants by statute. 1 Id. § 101;
see, for example, NEW YORK REAL PROP. LAW § 66.
24. Woolever v. Knapp, 18 Barb. 265 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1854) ; LeBarron v. Babcock,
122 N. Y. 153, 25 N. E. 253 (1890). At common law cotenants were not liable to each
other even for rents actually received. 2 Co. Lrr. *200b. The Statute of Queen Anne
adopted by many of the states and reenacted in others, made cotenants liable for "receiv-
ing" more than their "just proportion" from the cotenancy. 4 ANNE, c. 16, § 27 (1705).
This language has been generally construed not to change the immunity of cotenants
from liability for use and occupancy, but applies only where one cotenant has actually
received rents. Note (1923) 27 A. L. R. 1190.
25. It is significant that the first case to decide the effect of the Statute of Queen
Anne on liability for use and occupancy was one in which the defendant had derived
profit by virtue of his exclusive labor on the common property. -enderson v. Eason,
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the justification disappears where the benefits represent merely a return on
a capital investment made by the decedent. It is in the latter form that the
problem most often arises today, for the common situation is that of an heir
occupying land and buildings owned by the decedent. The indiscriminate
application of the cotenancy rule to any heir in possession will generally result,
then, in an unmerited enrichment of that heir at the expense of his fellows.
Concededly, therefore, the effects of this anachronism should be avoided; but
the method should not be mere circumvention by expanding the powers of
the personal representative, for that cure may well be worse than the evil?
In the great majority of cases, the rental value of realty occupied by one
heir or devisee could be shared amicablv among the beneficiaries of the estate
by some common agreement. The more direct method of repudiating the
cotenancv rule would open the way to equitable distribution while avoiding
the delay and expense of administration.
Where an heir or devisee acts as personal representative, there is no objec-
tion to securing an equitable distribution of the rental value by charging him
on his account for use and occupancy of the estate's realty. It makes no
difference whether the cotenancy rule is expressly changed or whether he is
charged on his account, since the latter would not add to the expense of
administration and is probably the easiest way of distributing the rent from
the property which he occupies. Of course, the statutes do not specificall:,,
cover the obligations of a personal representative, - but New York might
have followed the rule evolved by other states without the aid of statute: that
precisely because of his fiduciary position, a personal representative, whether
distributee or not, will be held strictly accountable fi-or all benefits derived
from the estate during its administration whi-olly asiole from the question of
solvencv. 2 s
9 Eng. L. & Eq. R. 337 (1851). The same is true of the first case in New Yuirk.
Noolever v. Knapp, IS Barb. 265 (N. Y. Sup. Ct 1854).
26. As previously indicated, the collection of rent by the personal representative
from the distributees would only mean delay in their full enjoyment of the proceeds
of the realt- and additional expense to the estate in the form of the fiduciary's cam-
missions.
27. An exception to this statutory silence is Maine, which requires a personal repre-
sentative to pay rent for use and occupancy. 'Mr. REv. ST %T. (1930) c. 76, § 57.
28. Kennedy v. Parks, 217 Ala. 323, 116 So. 161 (1928); Adams v. Bishop, 169
Ga. 762, 151 S. E. 377 (1929): Crowley v. Nixon, 132 Kan. 552, 296 Pac. 376 (1931).
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